An integrated management system for the Navy's technical manpower training programs. by Chasse, Robert Leon
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1968-04
An integrated management system for the Navy's








DUDLEY KNOX liB 
· AVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
T · Y ·CA 93943-5101 
I AN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR I 
THE NAVY'S TECHNICAL MANPOWER 
TRAINING PROGRAMS 
L 
CDR Robert L. Chasse, USN 
NAVY GRADUATE FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
_j 
' i 
AN INTEGRA TED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR 
THE NAVY ' S TECHNICAL MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS 
By 
Robert Leon Chasse 
11 
Bachel or of Science 
College of the Holy Cross, 1952 
A Thesis Submitted to the School of Government and 
Business Administration of the George 
Washington University in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of 
Business Administration 
April 1968 
Thesis directed by 
Edwin Timbers, Ph .D. 
Director of the Navy Graduate 
Financial Management Program 
\ 
.. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 







INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Statement of the Problenl 
The Hypothesis 
Method of Presentation 
Limitations 
BACKGROUND • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The Fleet Ballistic Missile Program - A Short 
History 
Purpose of the FBM Program 
THE FBM WEAPONS SYSTEM TRAINING PROGRAM • • • 
~he Beginning of the Training Program 
The Development of an FBM Training Philosophy 
RECENT CHANGES IN TECHNICAL MANPOWER TRAINING 
PROORAMS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e 
The Effects of the Dillon Report 
The CAPRI System 
The Polaris/Poseidon Training Schedule and 
Equipment Requirements 
TECHNICAL TRAINING COURSE REQUIREMENTS • • 
Efficiency Criteria for Polaris Training 
Courses 
• • 







TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued 
VI. AN INTEGRATED TECHNICAL MANPOWER TRAINING 
PROGRAM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 89 
VII. 
Polaris/Poseidon Training 
Applicability to other Navy Technical 
Training Programs 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS • • • • • • • • • • 
• • . . . 
. . . • • • • . . . . • • • • 
• • 
• • APPENDIX •• 







The Navy of the future requires personnel with 
unexcelled technical, managerial and operational 
competence to develop, maintain, and be ready to 
employ the c~lex weapons systems now on the 
horizon. In th~ face of an increasing demand 
for such compe ency, officer and enlisted, there is 
a decreasing supply. Personnel programs fall short 
of essential goals. The outlook for the future is 
not bright. ~Jithout a new look at the problem, em-
ploying what some may think to be radical measures, 
the situation will worsen. There are innumerable 
factors which give rise to our present personnel 
problems. The solution to man~f these is outside 
the control of the Department L2f the Na~ , but 
that should not lessen our efforts to press for the 
actions we think essential. For the problems within 
our control, we will be remiss if we1do not give them the highest priority attention. 
So stated the "Dillon Reportn to the Secretary of Navy 
on 15 December 1962. The report 1s statement of personnel pro-
blems reflects the importance of the personnel subsystem within 
the total Navy system. Much effort and funds has been expended 
since the "Dillon Report 11 was published to locate, analyze and 
solve the personnel subsystem problems referred to by the re-
port. 'fhe situation, nevertheless, is not mueh better than it 
was six years ago. True, many problems have been resolved. 




problems seem to surface as fast as the old or current ones are 
resolved. 
This is not intended to insinuate that the Navy of the past 
and present has not been effective. Quite the contrary, the 
Navy has been instrumental in this country ' s prompt and effective 
responses to the varied Cold War requirements incl uding strategic 
nuclear deterrents.2 But our Navy of today and tomorrow must not 
be complacent because of past successes. Rather, it must respond 
to the changing tempo with a strengthened capability for an even 
higher proportion of future successes~ This cannot be achieved 
by retaining "buggy-whipn management philosophies. 
The increasing complexity in weapons and equipment, caused 
largely by the greater use or electronics and automation and 
approaching "push-button" warfare, has exerted pressure for more 
and better maintenance personnel. The forces which render ob -
solete the traditional management methods also raise new problems 
in the management of this country's most priceless resource-- the 
human be1ng.3 
In addition$ the demands of the continuing cold- and warm-
war environment and weap ns complexity exert forceful pressures 
and demands .for economy. While responsive support of these de -
2I b1d ., p. 2 . 
3Ibid., p. 3 . 
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mands must t ake t he form of t he most modern, reliable, and 
effective weapons t hi s co nt ry can produce and manned by compe-
tent personnel , we must be mindful of t he continuing hi gh 
inpact of t he defense budget n t he economy of the country. 
The American taxpayer can afford no less t han t he best rna age -
ment of t he large share of his income t hat is taken t o pay for 
his defense.4 
This t hesis exami nes one particu.lar element of the Navy ' s 
overall appr oach to provide our customer, t he American tax-
payer, with an effective Navy at minimum cost . This particul ar 
element is t he Navy ' s technical manpower traini ng programs , t he 
s i ne qua non of its effectiveness and, to a l esser degree, its 
efficiency . 
St atement of t he Problem 
Man i s no l onger sol ely a user of military har dware syb-
tems; he is an int egral part of t hem . Man has become the vj. t al 
and often limiting component of t he man-machi ne syst em $ v!it h:il 
t he Navy, post-World War II emphasi s in t he RDT&E process has 
been on har dwar e . Other factors of syst em devel opment, particu-
l arl y the human factor, have oft en received onl y marginal 
attention and minimal support.5 
This over emphasis on hardware has both i mmediate 
an l ong- range implicat ions on t he effec t iveness of 
4Ibid . , p • 4 . 
5~., p. 98 . 
our combat forces. As for today's problems, one need 
only compare the results of the Polaris Program (a 
total system effort) with hardware oriented efforts. 
The success of the Pol aris Program can be attributed 
in a large measure to the inclusion of all subsystems 
--including the human subsystem- - in the total 
"Special Project" effort.b 
The basic question t o be discussed is a l ogical follow-on 
to the above statement. An examination of the Polaris Training 
Program and its management should indicate the reasons behind 
the stated success of this particul ar aspect of the Polaris Pro-
gram. The assessment of the effectiveness of the management 
systems utilized in the Navy ' s Fleet Ballistic Missile feapons 
System Training Program and whether the program can be improved 
is the fundamental question to be examined. 
The discussion of this basic question requires the exami-
nation of several subsidiary questions, namel y: 
1. What management techniques does the Navy 's FBr4 Weapons 
Systems Technical Manpower Training Program utilize? 
2. What levels of effectiveness and efficiency have been 
realized in this program with the present management techniques? 
3. How and in what areas could t hese management techniques 
be improved in order to produce the same or a better product at 
less cost? 
4. How effective and efficient is the teaching aspect of 
the training program and could it be improved? 
5 
5. Can an integrated ~echnical Manpower Tr~ining Program 
Management System be devel oped to meet the objectives of the 
Navy ' s FEN Program? 
6. Could other Navy Technical Manpower Training Programs 
utilize such an integrated system? 
These questions are broad in scope but must be considered 
in order that a valid training program can be developed. Past 
and present training programs must be examined in order to de -
termine their validity. The valid components of this training 
program can thus be included in a "total training system" de -
signed to meet the Navy ' s present and future training 
requirements. 
The Hypothesis 
The ypothesis of this study is that the Pol aris Training 
Program ' s high level of effectiveness is due, primarily, to the 
high priority for men, material s and funds enjoyed by the entire 
Polaris program and to the caliber and dedication of the person-
nel involved in the program . The management system employed to 
plan, impl ment, control and evaluate this training program has 
not been the primary reason for the program ' s effectiveness . In 
many cases, the management system failed to recognize· and imple -
ment procedures designed to improve efficiency. Program 
effectiveness could deteriorate unless new training and manage-
ment concepts are implemented and utilized prop rly. 
1 
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Method of Presentation 
Three basic areas of manpower training are considered in 
this study. The first is the organizational s tructure estab-
lished to plan, implement, control and evaluate the Polaris 
Training Program. The second is an examination of the manage-
ment information systems being used to assist the program 
managers. The third is a look at the training itsel f with the 
intention of forcing a reevaluation of the Polaris training 
philosophy . Although the problem centers on the integration of 
these three areas using a systems approach, it is necessary to 
understand the implications of each. 
Chapter II is devoted to a brief history of the Polaris 
Program and the basic purpose of the program. Chapter III 
focuses on the beginning of the Polaris Training Program and the 
development of an FBM Training philosophy. Chapter IV examines 
the effects of the Dillon Report on technical training. It also 
examines the management information systems available and in use 
by the program managers. Chapter V considers an efficiency cri-
teria for Polaris training courses and proposes a "Technology of 
Training" to improve this efficiency criteria. Chapter VI ex-
amines a proposed Polaris Technical Manpower Training Program and 
its possible application to other technical training programs. 





The scope of this study is limit d primarily to the train-
ing acti ities associated with the Polaris program . Other 
training activities are introduced briefly to reinforce certain 
concepts or to demonstrate the applicabil ity of the situation or 
solutions . 
No substantial attempt is made to examine the human element 
as it reacts to a training situation. The motivational aspects 
of learning are only considered briefly because the human factors 
involved are too complex and manifold for proper treatment in 
this study. 
Comments on equipment and system design are excluded. It 
must be recognized, however, that equipm nt and system designs 
play an important role in the functional reliability of a weapons 
system. Clearly, there is much the designer can do to simplify 
the task of the equipment operator/maintenance technician and, as 
a consequence, simplify the training task. It should be clear 
that training itself is merel y one sub-system among several which 
contributes to the overall effectiveness of a weapons system . 
The author has endeavored to steer clear of the complex and 
controversial questions relating to the increase or decrease in 
the use of NEC ' ~Pro-pay and Variable Reenlistment Bonuses. These 
factors can have a substantial effect on a training program and 
present a fertile area for further investigation. 
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The discussion is limited to the Polaris Weapons System 
Training Program which includes the Navigation, Fire Control, 
Missile and Guidance, and Launching subsystems. It is recognized 
that this is only ,part o£ the total training package required by 
the FBM system. The exclusion of the other training programs 
within the FBM system is not meant to indicate that these other 
programs are of lesser importance but is due to the limited scope 
of this study. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROU1lJ) 
The Fleet Ballistic Missile Program - A Short History 
In order to understand better the discussions that will fol-
low concerning the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Training Program, 
a short review of the history of the FBM program is deemed appro-
priate. Only the more significant highlights of the program and 
its development will be mentioned. These highlights, however, 
should indicate the tremendous complexity of the machine aspect of 
this man-machine system . It will then be apparent that a properly 
trained man is required in order to realize the degree of effec -
tiveness needed by this man-machine system. 
During the winter of 1955, a special com~ittee working for 
the National Security Council and headed by Dr James R. Killian, 
completed a survey of the East-West power balance and handed its 
report to President Eisenhower. Although it was never made publi~ 
the essence of the report was that the Soviet Union was rapidly 
overtaking the United States in overall strategic po\'Ier. Three of 
the committee ' s principal recommendations called for immediate 
action to meet the growing Russian missile threat. Specifically, 
these recommendations were:l 
1. Further acceleration of \'lork by the Air Force on the 
lJ. Baar and W.E. Howard, Polaris, (New York: Harcourt, 




2. Development by the Army of a 1~500 mile intermediate-
range ballistic missile - an IRBM. 
3. The parallel development of an IRBM that could be 
launched from ships at sea. 
It was not until 13 september 1955, that the President de-
cided to implement the :r-ecommendations of the Killian Report . 
Progress on recommendation number three was slow primarily because 
the Defense Department was hesitant in authorizing the Navy to 
proceed with the development or a sea-launched IRBM. I4any people 
in DOD and in the Navy doubted the practicality of a liquid-
fueled missile on ships. o satisfactory solid rocket fuel was 
available at the time and a liquid-fueled missile was considered 
extremely dangerous in a shipboard environment . Because of this 
inherent danger, development work was practically at a standstill . 
However, in early December 1955, the Navy made probably the 
most important single decision involving the fleet ballistic 
missile--it selected a man to create it in the person of Rear 
Admiral Will iam F. 11Redn Raborn . Admiral Raborn received his 
"hunting license" in the form of a letter from the secretary of 
the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations . This letter granted 
him extraordinary authority 1n the development of an F~1 capa-
bility. 
Thus, on 8 December 1955, the Special Projects Office was 
created when Admiral Raborn opened his small office in an old 
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building behind the Main Navy Building in Washington, D.C. He 
assembl ed a staff with proven technical and administrative capa-
bilities and embarked on a development and production program 
unparalleled in American peacetime history . 
In the late summer of 1956, two technological breakthroughs 
occurred which changed the entire complex of the Navy ' s program. 
The Special Projects Office received word from the Atomic Energy 
Commission that a big reduction in the size of nuclear warheads 
was possible. This, in turn, reduced the size of the IRBM 
missile required . It was also determined that a small solid-fuel 
-propelled ballistic missile was feasible. On 8 December 1956, 
the Secretary of Defense, after being convinced by Admiral Raborn , 
ordered the Navy to discontinue its work on the liquid fuel ed 
missile and to concentrate its efforts in the development of t he 
solid-fueled Polaris. 2 The original estimate for the compl etion 
of the first operational system was 1965 . Shortly after the 
Polaris concept was approved, however, the est imate was revised 
to 1963. 
The advent of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 generated a much 
greater urgency in the United States missil e and space program . 
The acceptance of some compromises in the final syst em capabil i-
ties made it possible to reduce the 1963 operational date of 
Polaris by three years to December 1960 . This decision made it 
necessary to reduce devel opment time wherever possible . 
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A missile wi'th a 1200 nautical ·-mile range would be used in-
stead of the originally planned 1500. The design of the entire 
system would have to utilize less of the more sophisticated com-
ponents originally planned and rely more on components within the 
capabilities· of .the present "state oi' the art" . The f'irst sub-
marines would have to be of an existing design modified by adding 
a 130-foot missile compartment section to the hull in order to 
permit submarine construction to start in January 1958. 
Many problems He~e encountered during the following months 
and years. The top military/civilian management team assembled 
and guided by A~~iral Raborn~ maintained a constant pressure on 
thousands of contractors. success was achieved on 15 November 
1960, when the USS George Washington, SSBN 598, departed 
Charleston, South Carolina, for the first operational patrol with 
sixteen Polaris A-1 missiles on board beating the scheduled date 
by over a month. Other highlights of the progrrun in chrono-
logical order are as follows: 
11 January 1958 - First Polaris test flight, Point Mugu, 
California. 
23 June 1958 - First FBM Submarine, the USS George 
Washington, SSBN 598, launched at Groton, Connecticut. 
7 January 1960 - First inertially guided Polaris test vehicle 
flight fully successful at Cape Canaveral, Florida . 
14 April 1960 - First successful underwater launch of a 
Polaris test vehicle at San Clemente Island, California . 
' 
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20 July 1960 - First launch of a Polaris test vehicle 
from USS George Washington while submerged off Cape 
Canaveral.· 
15 November 1960 - USS George Washington begins the 
first Polaris deterrent patrol. 
22 November 1960 - First submarine, USS Ethan Allen, 
SSBN 608, designed from the keel up as an Fm~I sub-
marine, launched at Groton, Connecticut. 
23 October 1961 - First successful firing of the 1500 
nautical mile Polaris A-2 missile by the USS Ethan 
Allen off the Florida coast. 
6 May 1962 - Ethan Allen successfully fires and de-
tonates Polaris missile with a nuclear warhead while 
cruising in the Pacific Ocean. 
26 October 1963 - FiPst launching of a Polaris 2500 
nautical mile range A-3 wisslle by USS Andrew Jackson, 
SSBN 619, off the Florida coast.3 
25 December 1964 - USS Daniel Boone, SSBN 629, begins 
the first Pacific Polaris patrol making the FBM weapon 
system a truly global deterrent. 
18 January 1965 - P:eesident Johnson announces decision 
to develop a new missile for the FBM vJeapons System, 
3nepartment of the Navy, The Naval Fleet Ballistic 
Missile Training Program, {Washington: u.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1964), p. 6. 
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the Poseidon. 
3 October 1967 - USS Will Rogers~ SSBN 659, last of the 
41 authorized FBM submarines, departs on her first 
operational patrol. 
During this period of time, from late 1955 to late 1967, 
over twelve billion dollars was authorized for the program, 41 
nuclear powered SSBN submarines were built and deployed at an 
average cost of over 106 million dollars each, five Polaris 
tenders were built (one converted and four bui~t from the keel up) 
to support the submarines at deployed sites, four Polaris weapons 
training facilities, at a cost of 338 million dollars, were con-
structed to train the personnel needed to man the ships and 
activities associated with the program and two logistic support 
centers were constructed.4 Each of the 41 SSBN's has undergone a 
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO) off Cape Kennedy 
during which each SSBN was qualified to fire tactical missiles 
(less warhead) prior to beginning its initial operational patrol . 
The DASO results to date (late 1967) are as follows:5 
A-1 missile - 21 successful out of 36 attempts 
A-2 missile 
- 38 successful out of 43 attempts 
A-3 missile 
- 55 successful out of 51 attempts 
4Department of the Navy, Special Projects Office, PolarisL 
Poseidon Fact Sheet, (Washington: Special Projects Office, I 




These results are as good and, for the most part, better t han ob-
tained with any of the other deterrent missile systems in the 
United States arsenal. 
Thus, a system went from the drawing board to a highly rea-
liable and effective deterrent system in four years and was 
completed in less than twelve years. When development work began 
in 1956, the only part of the FBM system that was a real ity was 
the nuclear powered submarine. The other parts of the system, in 
many instances, existed only as an idea. Reaearch and development 
work had to be undertaken into areas of technology such as solid 
fuel rockets, small inertial guidance systems for missiles, ad-
vanced ship navigation systems and unde~water missile launching 
techniques where little was known at the time. 
The Special Projects Office, with the assistance of advanced 
management systems such as PERT, was able to coordinate the ef-
forts of a vast Navy-Industry team so that a deterrent system was 
deployed five years ahead of the original target date. The same 
team has maintained a high and productive level of effort and has 
constantly improved the capability and reliability of the system 
a.s can be seen from the DASO firing statistics mentioned pre-
viously. Their past, present and future achievements wil l 
certainly go down in history as one of the most remarkabl e aecom-
plishments of the modern era. 
One of the unique features of the FBM submarine program is 
that each of the 41 submarines has two complete and int er-
16 
changeable crews, called "Blue" and "Gold" . While one crew 
operates the submarine on its regular cycle of two-month deterrent 
patrol s , the other crew is back at its home port. The firs t month 
after returning from patrol is usually spent getting reacquainted 
with the world after their two-month submerged patrol . Then 
they undergo a refresher training period prior to undertaking 
their next patrol. The following chart indicates how the crews 
are interchanged in a constant cycle:6 
"BLUE II and n GOLD" 
CRE\-J CYCLE* 
Duration Blue Crew Gold Crew 
60 days Patrol Refresher Training 
30 days Leave Submarine Upkeep 
60 days Refresher Training Patrol 
30 days Submarine Upkeep Leave .,. 
60 days Patrol Refresher Training 
*Approximate 
This two-crew system was adopted in order t o accomplish 
several objectives . Most important, it permits the submarine to 
remain at its foi~ard operating site without having to return to 
the United states to provide the crew with a rest period . This 
allows the submarine to be kept on patrol in a full deterrent 
posture for two-thirds of its operational lifetime thereby 
6Department of the Navy~ Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
Recruiting Aids Division, Polaris -Missiles and Men,(Washington: 
RAD, 1 July 1967), p. 17. 
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accomplishing the same level of deterrance with fewer submarines . 
It also provides a !!refresher training" period f'or each crew 
in order to maintain the cre-...Is 1 proficiency and to update their 
knowledge required by the constant refinements and modifications 
being made to equipn,ent and operating procedure. 7 These re-
fresher training sites are located at each of the three FBM sub -
marine home ports, namely, New London, Connecticut; Charleston, 
South Carolina; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The location of these 
sites at the crew ' s homeport permits the "off-crewn to live at 
home during their refresher training period, ·a defini'(;e morale 
factor. 
Purpose of the FErll Program 
The Polaris man-machine-missile ystem was designed for one 
purpose only-- the prevention of nuclear war. The FEM weapon 
system is the Navy ' s major contribution to the United States mix 
of strategic deterrent weapons. Hidden, mobile, ready and 
little noticed by the world at large, a growing fleet of nuclear 
powered FBM submarines, eacn carrying sixteen nuclear tipped 
Polaris missiles, has, since 15 November 1960, roamed the oceans 
of the world assuring any potential enemy that should he launch a 
nuclear attack on this country, he would receive a crippling 
nuclear blow in response . Each of the now completed fleet of 41 
submarines carries more destructive power within its hull than 
all that unleashed throughout World v1ar II . 
7~. ,. p . 18 . 
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Prevention of war may seem an un~aual mission for submarines, 
but in the age of the ICBM, unusual strategies are necessary . The 
FBM system has been highly effective in the implementation of this 
"strategy of deterrence 11 .. A nwar deterrent" is effective only if 
the enemy is convinced of its ability to retaliate . The nuclear 
powered FBM submarine with its capability to roam anywhere in the 
world ' s oceans, can bring any target on earth within range of its 
sixteen missiles. This mobility and its ability to hide under 
the ocean curtain for months at a time, makes it practically im-
possible for the enemy to locate and destroy this force . The 
range, secrecy and mobility of the submarine also complicates 
the enemy's defensive problem by denying him the information of 
the direction from which a retaliatory strike would come. 
The Polaris program has been a sparkling success to date . 
No patrol has ever been aborted due to failure of the system 
which includes the missiles, submarine and the crew. The missiles 
have a higll record of Peliab1l:tty and dependibility. All sixteen 
missiles on each submarine on p~:~.trol have been ready for firing 
more than 98 per cent of the time with fifteen missiles being 
ready 99.9. per cent of the time.8 It is the only missile system 
in the United States arsenal that has been fully tested including 
the detonation of a nuclear warhead delivered by an operational 
system aboard a submarine. In addition, in over 500 patrols since 
8H.W .. Baldwin. 11Poseidon - New Chapter in Missilery"# 
Reader's Digest , (February, 1968}, p. 123. 
i 
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196C, no Polaris submarine - once submerged on a combat patrol --
has, as ft>.r as can be ascertained., ever been detected, much less 
9 tracked, by the Russians. 
The ::;ystem has been continually improved since 1960. The 
first five submariDe::> (598 clans) carried the first generation 
Polaris A-1 missile on operational patrols. All five have since 
been returned to the United States, rGfitted to carry the longer 
ra~~e Polaris A-3 missiles, and have returned to their operational 
areas . Overhauls are unde~~ay for the five 608 class SSBN' s 
which carry and ..-.v-ill retain the Polaris A-2 missiles. 34 FBM 
submarines with 336 A-3 ~nd 208 A-2 missiles are assigned to the 
Atlantic F'leet and seven FB ·~ submarines 1'1ith 112 A-3 ' s are 
assigned to the Pacific Fleet . 10 
Starting in 1969, 31 of the FBtli submarines will be converted 
to C-3 or Poseidon missile capabilj_ty while the remaining ten ~:ill 
retain A--3 missiles. Poseidon ~'Jill have double the payload of 
the Polaris A-3, be twice ao accurate and have improved ability 
to penetrate enemy defenses giv.tng it an effectiveness about 
eight times greater than that of Polaris . The increased capabili-
ties of the Poseidon in addition to the inherent survivability of 
its launching platform, the nuclear-powered submarine, provides 
ample testimony to the fact that the FBM Weapons .System will 
9Ibid . 
lOpolaris/P~seidon Fact Sheet, op. cit., p. 1. 
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continue to be a reliable and credible retal iatory force for t his 
country for many years in the future .ll 
11 Ibid . , p . 7 . 
CHAPTER III 
THE FBM vlEAPONS SYSTEM TRAINTim PROGRPJ.7 
The Beginning of the Training Program 
The concept of a force of FBM submarines and their operating 
tactics was to be quite different than the traditional submarine 
tactics of actively seeking and engaging the enemy in combat. 
The ships were to avoid all contact, friendly or otherwise, in 
order to protect their secrecy while on patrol . In addition, the 
sophistication, complexity, and destructive potential of each of 
these submarines would require personnel trained and conditioned 
to cope with this unusual environment . It was clear that a 
special breed of men would be required to transform the sub-
marines, missiles and equipment into an effective deterrent force 
from the very beginning of the Pol aris program . Since these men 
were not available, they would have to be trained and developed . 
The key and controlling element in the entire FBM system was 
recognized early as the human one . This 11personnel subsystem" 
was the individual in the man-machine complex who is required to 
operate and maintain the equipment at peak performance in order 
to satisfy the systems ' deterrent mission . Since time was a tre-
mendous constraint for the initial training of the first FBM 
~leapons and Navigation personnel as well as the personnel in 
other areas, handpicked seasoned submariners were detail ed as t he 




associated with the Navy ' s 11Regulus" program. This program 
utilized a jet-propelled pilotless aircraft launched from and 
guided by submarines to its target. By utilizing these personnel, 
the transition to a ballistic missile system could be made faster 
and more effectively. Nevertheless, a training program was be-
gun even as the ships' equipment was being designed and built to 
insure that there would be sufficient numbers of men trained and 
ready to man the first operational FBM submarines . 
The Navy, in 1957, really did not have a missile system 
training capability . There ~1ere no schools or organizations 
ready to develop and coordinat e such a training capability. In 
addition, there was very little "in-house" knowledge concerning 
the complicated missile fire control, guidance, launching and 
navigation systems that would be required in order to implement a 
training program. Not enough time was available to permit the 
Navy to develop this nin-housei' capability to train Polaris wea-
pons personnel to the level required to operate and maintain the 
complex weapons system. Therefore, the handpicked, seasoned sub-
mariners \-Jere detailed to attend so-called "factory training 
courses" at the contractors plants and sites where the various 
weapons equipments were being developed, fabricated, assembled and 
tested. 
Many of the early personnel gained their experience in the 
system by vvorking with engineers and technicians while the equip= 
ment was being designed , built and tested. By early 1959$ most 
of the major equipment contractors had acquired a basic 
1 
11 in-house" capability on their particular part of the system and 
had organized training courses on a more formal basis . Stil l, in 
many cases, the learning and teaching process wan combined with 
both instructors and students learning together from prel iminary 
drawings and manuals . 
Earl y in this period, it became apparent that the personnel 
undergoing factory training did not have a sufficient background 
in the space-age applications of elec tronics . This made it 
difficult for them to assimilate the level of information needed 
to operate and maintain the complex equipment proper·ly. The 
student needed a basic understanding of electronics, computers , 
solid-state circuitry, Boolean a l gebra , rocket propulsion, in-
ertial guidance principles and physics . 
3ince the factory training courses were predicated on the 
assumption that the student had this background, it was necessary 
that the Navy develop a basic course t hat could fulfill this re-
quirement. Facilities were avail able at the Guided Missil e School, 
Dam Neck, Virginia, and in mid-1959, the fll.,st Special Technol ogy 
course, covering the basics of missilery listed above, was con-
vened at the Guided Missiles School. In addition, a short 
introductory course to the entire weapons system was a l so de-
veloped . This mar•ked the beginning of the development of an 




The organization avail able to plan, develop, coordinate and 
implement the training requirements during this period was rel a-
tively simple and basic. It consisted of a few people at the 
Special Projects Office, the Bureau of Naval Personnel and repre-
sentatives of the Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force. As the various 
training requirements devel oped, this small and flexible organi-
zation would contact the various contractors, often by telephone 
or through personal visits, briefly outline the requirements, ob-
tain the contractor's commitment, and then follow-up with ·the 
necessary paper work. Although this procedure was extremely res-
ponsive to the needs of the FBM program, it often was not the 
most effective or economical. 
However, the main constraint was time and very little time 
was avail able for detailed pl anning of training courses and pro-
cedures . The training requirements often became known only after 
personnel had attended a course and discovered that they either 
did not receive the proper training or enough of it. Supplemen-
tary courses would then be quickly organized and conducted in an 
attempt to fill the knowledge gaps discovered . The dynamic nature 
of the program also made it extremely difficult to develop stan-
dard curricula because equipment design, principles, configura-
tions, capabilities and operating characteristics were often 
changing on a daily basis. 
The pressure to deliver the equipment to the submarine build-
ing site often made it difficult for the contractor training 
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personnel to permit the students to study and operate the various 
equipment at t he contractor ' s plants. The contractor ' s engineers 
and technicians were working on the equipment on a 24-hour basis 
in order to meet tight delivery schedules. This often made it 
impractical to permit the students to work and operate the equip-
ment . This limitation defeated one of the purposes of conducting 
courses at the contractors ' plants. 
Another serious deficiency with the concept of factory train-
ing was the fact that each contractor could only instruct on his 
own particular equipment and could not effectively cover the in-
terfaces, interconnections and interreactions between the various 
subsystems. This system information was vital to the technician 
and equipment operator if he was going to operate and maint ain the 
system effectively . A malfunction i n one subsystem could easily 
manifest itself in anot her subsystem, and , unless the operator 
understood the interrel ationships between subsystems, he was at a 
loss as to how to correct t he malfuncti on . 
In late 1959 and early 1960, plans were initiated to centra-
lize the initial training for Polaris technicians and officers at 
the Guided Missiles School at Dam Neck. Again, due to the press 
of time and to the rather loose nature of the planning and coordi-
nating organization for training, many decisions were made 
regarding this training facility that proved inadequate . A study 
for the Special Projects Office, dated 11 October 1960, pointed 
out deficiencies in the Polaris Training program as existed at 
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that time. 1 
The study indicated that the need for maintenance training 
equipment was critical . Procurement of this equipment should 
have been initiated earlier to meet the increasing requirements 
to train Polaris maintenance technicians properly and adequately. 
The basic problem was the urgency of installing the equipment in 
a permanent school such as the Guided Missiles School~ The pro-
blem of training crews properly was becoming acute at this time, 
because the program was expanding rapidly and the supply of ex-
perienced personnel that formed the handpicked crews of the first 
submarines was exhausted. These experienced personnel could cope 
with most of the shortcomings of factory training. The less ex-
perienced students could not overcome these shortcomings and, 
consequently, were not being adequately trained at the factory 
schools . 
There was an urgent need for a more thorough and closely 
controlled training program than could be achieved with factory 
training. In some cases, as mentioned previously, the factory 
schools did not have the equipment available for training. This 
permitted, in too many cases, the technician to report to his 
submarine without any equipment training whatsoever . 
The fact that factory training was expensive was another pro-
blem that was brought to light in this study . The following were 
1Department of the Navy, Special Projects Office, 
Polaris Training Requirements, ( SPO, 11 Oct. 1960), p. 1-3. 
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cited as the BuPers contract training and Temporary Additional 
Duty dollar costs per average student week :2 
Navigation Missile Fire Control MTRE 
Technician Technician Technician Technician 
Contract 
Cost $363 $400 $230 $240 
Per Diem 
and Travel $104 $103 $103 $103 
Total/Student $467 $503 $333 $343 Week 
The cost for the same training, if provided at a Navy school, was 
es t imated to be less than $80 .00 per student week . It was ob-
vious that a central Navy school was essential for purely 
economical reasons. 
The fact that the frequent moves by the personnel to the 
various factory sites were detrimental to morale was another dis-
advantage of factory training . Personnel control was also poor 
and could have been maintained much easier at a Navy facility. 
The environment at a Navy facility is usually more conducive to 
the intensive study required during advanced training. 
The quality control of the various courses was also diffi-
cult to maintain due to the geographic dispersal of the factory 
sites and the fact that control of the course content itsel f was 
weak. This quality control was essential in order to produce a 
properly and uniformly trained technician . 
There was no longer a question, therefore, about the 
2Ibid ., p . 4 . 
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demonstrated requirements for a Navy Polaris school . It became 
a problem on how best to go about getting this school and staff-
ing it in time to meet the increasing needs of the ~xpanding 
Polaris program. 
The question of time was again paramount. In October 1960, 
under the existing funding and installation plans,it was realized 
that only half of the crews for the 41 submarines and their sup-
porting activities would receive initial training on actual 
equipment at the Guided Missiles School. The initial training 
requirements of the program could not be met unless definite 
action was taken to increase the training capabilities at G~S as 
soon as possible by the establishment of higher equipment and in-
stallation priorities and by advanced funding. The alternatives 
were either a slow-down on the Ready-for-Sea schedules for the 
FBM submarines due to lack of properly trained crews or the accep-
tance of a reduced level of readiness that would result from 
utilizing inadequately trained technicians. The first alternative 
was unacceptable due to overriding national requirements. The 
latter alternative, although undesirable, had to be accepted. 
Even with increased equipment procurement and installation 
priorities, the advanced funding could not buy the time that had 
been lost due to inadequate forward planning. 
Fortunately for the program, the caliber and dedication of 
the personnel assigned to FBM activities remained high. In addi-
tion, the personnel after reporting to their activity during the 
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construction and testing periods, became deeply involved in this 
testing program and gained additional experience and knowledge 
about the systems. In spite of the fact that their training 
had definite shortcomings, their knowledge of the equipment and 
the systems was often better than that of the people who were 
supposed to install and test the equipment on board the ship. 
The Navy personnel gained much needed knowledge and experience 
and materially assisted in maintaining the testing on schedule 
by working with shipyard personnel. 
The need for fully pre-trained crews had made it necessary 
for the Polaris program to depart from the traditional Navy 
practice of providing basic instruction in a particular area 
in a Class "A" school and then training the man on the job after 
he reported to his ship or activity. Polaris required a fully 
trained crew because of the high level of readiness needed and 
the limited shipboard training opportunities available. The 
readiness level required to permit the submarine to launch mis-
siles within fifteen minutes after receiving the order, allows 
little time for novices to gain experience in finding and cor-
recting malfunctions. The hazard of inexperienced personnel 
injecting more errors into the system while troubleshooting mal-
functions is ever-present and could not be accepted. 
The design of the FBM system components for modular main-
tenance facilitates the replacement and repair of defective 
modules. These features were built into the system to minimize 
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shipboard repair requirements and to permit the rapid replace-
ment of malfunctioning components thereby increasing system 
reliability. 
The most vital element influencing this reliability, once 
the submarine departs on patrol, is the man who can detect, 
localize, eliminate or compensate for any malfunction . Thus, 
the maintenance technician is primarily a diagnostician and only 
incidentally a repairman . This made the term "maintenance" 
training misleading as it commonly denotes training required to 
repair faulty items . Feedback from the first crews» both prior 
to and after their first patrol, indicated that over 59 per cent 
of the problems encountered were system problems . It was neces-
sary to train the technician to understand and diagnose these 
system problems. No training to develop the ability to analyze 
and to locate system malfunctions was being provided . This 
ability was the critical skill required to insure the operation-
al reliability of the system. 
The Development of an FBM Training Philosophy 
The realization of this system diagnostic capability train-
ing requirement , -after the first five FBM crews and one tender 
crew had been trained, provided an increased impetus to resolve 
this glaring training deficiency and to review the overall 
training progr•am. Plans were developed to incorporate system 
introduction and training into the training coursea . 





requirements was reviewed. This review considered seve~al re-
lated factors in the determination of training equipment 
requirements and resulted in a more systematic allocation pro-
cedure. The fact that the students had to be trained on actual 
tactical equipment in order to gain the experience needed was 
paramount in this allocation procedure . 
The criterion adopted was that the curricula would specify 
50 per cent classroom training and 50 per cent equipment train-
ing . This criterion was already being utilized in other military 
training commands and in industry . 
Another important consideration was the maximum number of 
students that could be effectively and safely trained at one 
time on one equipment . The compactness of the FEM equipment 
severly limited this number . BuPers established a maximum num-
ber of three students on navigation and four on fire control 
equipment . Then, by projecting the expected student load, it 
was possible to determine the number of equipments of various 
types that would be requir ed . 
This was all well and good, but the high cost and shortage 
of FBM equipment plus the shortage of space made it impractical 
to satisfy this requirement for peak student loading periods . 
The actual number of equipments to be procured and installed 
made it necessary to plan utilization of the equipment on a two-
shift basis based on student loading after this load had stabi-
lized. During peak periods, the utilization of the equipments 
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on three shifts would barely meet the requirements. 
As a result of the study conducted in October 1960, the 
Special Projects Office, BuPers and the fleet commands finally 
formulated a set of guidelines for the establishment of an FBM 
maintenance training capability at the Guided Missile School . 
The guidelines adopted were as follows:3 
1 . Maintenance training can best be conducted on: 
a . Actual equipment of the same type and configuration 
that will be maintained by the technician once he re-
ports on board the ship, and 
b . Equipment that is interconnected into a system such 
as is found on board ship . 
2. The amount of equipment required for training depends on : 
a. The number of people that must be trained, and 
b. The manner in which these people will be trained . 
3. The personnel requirements , that is the number to be 
trained, is determined on a. fiscal-year basis through 
examination of: 
a. New crew personnel requirements which is determined 
by the number of new crews being formed in a fiscal 
year on the following basis: 
(1) The SSBN "Blue" crew is required on board at 
the Ready-for-Sea date minus ten months . 
(2) The SSBN "Gold" crew is required on board at 
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the Ready-for-Sea date minus seven months. 
( 3) The Submarine Tender crew is required on board 
at the Ready-for-Sea date minus six months. 
b . Replacement personnel requirements which are de-
termined by BuPers by applying empirical attrition 
factors to all billets based on: 
(1) Fleet attrition experienced in the FB forces . 
( 2) Sea-shore rotation losses. 
(3) School losses. 
4. The curriculum requirements are to be determined by Bu-
Pers as regards course length, content, presentation, methods 
and procedures and will be based on : 
a. The FBM maintenance concept . 
b. The experience gained in FBM factory training. 
c . The experience gained with overall Navy training. 
Once these guidelines had been formulated, the next logical 
step was to formalize the objectives of the initial FBM training 
program . The training objective was that every FBM technician 
should be competent to maintain the equipment for which he was 
responsible .4 The curriculum was to be designed to satisfy the 
needs of the forces afloat, because the forces afloa.t could not 
accompl ish this training objective. This was because each FBM 
patrol is made under ·Nartirne conditions which do not permit dis-
abling equipment for training. FBM operating schedules do not 
1 
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allow time for on-board maintenance training, and the lack of 
space aboard fleet units, particularly the SSBN's, precludes 
effective training. 
Several factors had to be taken into consideration in 
order to formulate a curriculum that could satisfy the training 
objectives. These factors were as follows: 
1. The experience level of the FBM trainee would decline 
rapidly. More than half of the future trainees would be 
strikers with no prevlous fleet duty. 
2. The lndividual FBM equipments are highly complex and 
involved, but the equipments comprise an even more highly 
complex and involved system. 
3. The relatively small number of technicians aboard an 
FBM submarine or tender makes it mandatory that each tech-
nician effectively pull his weight immediately after repor~ 
ing aboard . 
The curriculum characteristics that could satisfy the train-
ing objectives required that each trainee begin the course with 
a preliminary introduction in computer and inertial theory, that 
the curriculum be structured to permit 50 per cent classroom and 
50 per cent laboratory time, that only a small number of techni-
cians study on one equipment at one time and would stress the 
maintenance of the subsystem with which the trainee will be 
concerned after reporting to an FBM activity. 
All of the above guidelines served to formalize , to some 
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extent, the training requirements and philosophy of t he Polaris 
training pro;;ram. Hovo~ever, the formul ation of guidelines and 
their implementat ion are two entirely different things . Actually, 
the progr·am remained in the 11management by crisis i ! category un-
till early 1]61.~ vo~hen the majorl ty of eq'..l.ipments deemed necessary 
to conduct the training as outl ined in th0 guidelines was 
finally installed and made operational . The success o"' the 
Polaris program VJas heavily dependent on the personnel who oper-
ate- the syste.ns . r l'lat hose personnel effect ively performed 
this mission and t hat t raining \'las conducted effectively was, 
up to early 1964 , prima ily due to the efr'orts &nd capabilities 
ol the personnel involved and not the system utilized to plan 
and man3.ge th.; training . 
The training course contents and length was usually deter-
mined. by the inst.i."uctors at the Guided Missiles .School based on 
their experience and knm·.Jledge of the systems with some assist -
ance from the O~erating Forces and BuPers . This procedure was 
not acco:.. ... dlnc?; to the guidelines provided , but since nobody else 
could or vvou..1.d provide a for1nal curriculum, the Gr4S instructors , 
by der·aul t , ·,·Jt:re :r.~equired to prepare their mm in..:'ormal curricula . 
In early 1963, BuPers , at the insistence of he school and the 
fleet, assigned patrol-experienced personnel to the school as 
i11s ·cructo.t·b . Patrol-e:~perienced ofi'i<.!ers were assi1;ned to 
supervi::3e anti coo1 ... di11a tu the ·training in the Heap ns a . .td nav-
igation aJ. .. f;:aS. This step waa taken pl~ilfia.elly due to fleet 
f 
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complaints that the training provided at the school was not suffi-
ciently oriented toward meeting the needs of the fleet. 
Very little formal research had been conducted to determine 
exactly what the Polaris technician needed in the way of training 
prior to reporting aboard an operating unit. The assignment of 
experienced personnel from these operating units to the school 
was made in the hope that the experienced personnel could better 
determine what training was required and how it should be con-
ducted . Fortunately, these people were given a relatively free 
hand in making these determinations, and the courses were revised 
to provide the operating units with a trained product who was 
better prepared to fulfil l the demanding requirements of the 
Operating Forces . 
In order to prepare a better and more uniformly trained 
technician, the writing and compiling of formal detailed curricula 
was also undertaken in late 1963. These curricula replaced the 
various lesson plans formulated by individual instructors. The 
different lesson plans for the conduct of the same courses had 
made it impossible to provide all the students with the same t3pe, 
depth and amount of training. Standard curricula and lesson plans 
helped to insure that all students in the same course of instruc-
tion would receive the same training . 
A shi ft in training philosophy also occurred due to t he i n-
flux of patrol-experienced personnel into the training area . 
These personnel realized that in order to develop a good system 
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diagnostician, the concept of 11maintenance training" as had been 
formulated by the 1960 study group was misl eading . They believed 
that maintenance training ·well seasoned with operational training 
would produce a much better system diagnostician. 
This realization led to the adoption of a watch-training 
concept during which the trainee would operate the equipment much 
like he would aboard the FBM unit. The student was required to 
perform all the routine system tests, operate the system in its 
various modes, locate malfunctions inserted by instructors, main-
tain the watch records as required on board an operating unit and 
respond effectively to any situation imposed by the instructors. 
After undergoing this type of training, the student was much 
better prepared to fulfill the objectives of the training program 
by being able to report to his unit and immediately start "pull-
ing his weight". 
It can be seen, therefore, that the problems encountered 
during the early phases of the FBM training program v1ere consider-
able. The inputs to the program carne from many different sources 
such as BuPers, Special Projects, the fleet, Polaris contractors 
and the Guided Ivlissile School itself'. The coordination of efforts 
between these various activities left much to be desired. A 
formal management system for the training program which could de-
velop and implement long-range training plans and requirements 
did not really exist. "r-lanagement by crisis" was the rule rather 
than the exception. 
·• 
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In spite of these shortcomings, the training program was 
relatively successful in meeting its requirements. This was due , 
as previously stated, primarily to the efforts and capabilities 
of the individuals involved rather than the management system 
currently in effect. An additional factor that must not be over-
lool{ed was the fact that the Polaris program had top priority 
within the Navy for men, material and money . This top priority 
made "management by crisis" possible but at a much greater cost 
of men and materials than would have been required with an effec-
tive management system . 
Since 1964, the Polaris training progr·am has stabilized, and 
many of the problems encountered during its early s t ages have been 
resol ved . The effectiveness of the program has improved consis-
tently since its early days and is now ·as effective, if not more 
so, than the majority of the Navy's technical training programs. 
The relatively stable training requirements during the last four 
years have made it possible .to introduce, on a systematic basis, 
minor refinements that have contributed to the effectiveness of 
the program . The utilization of more patrol-experienced personnel 
as instructors, the updating and refinement of curricula., the in-
flux of patrol-experienced personnel in responsible management 
positions and the adoption of more realistic fleet evaluation and 
qualification programs all contributed to this improved l evel of 
effecti veness . 
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Although the effectiveness of the training program is high, 
the efficiency of the program has remained relatively low . The 
overriding tendency of the program managers to emphasize resul ts 
or outputs of the program with insufficient attention to the 
utilization of the program inputs is the primary reason for this 
lo~>J efficiency . The high program priority for money, men and 
materials has served to foster this output orientation . Some of 
the inefficiencies that have resulted from this output orientation 
are as follows: 
1 . Personnel have been overtrained . This has resul ted in 
increasing the number of personnel required . Training facility 
requirements are also increaseQ.. The productive utilization of 
personnel time is correspondingly reduced . 
2. The inventory of trained personnel has not been effici-
entl y utilized. Trained personnel have been assigned to duties 
not requiring their skills, because the program had at times, pro-
duced more trained personnel than could be utilized . In addition, 
the inventory of trained personnel has not been maintained in an 
up-to-date status thus providing the personnel detailers with 
erroneous detailing information. 
3. Training facilities and instructors are not consistentl y 
utilized in an efficient manner. Inadequate advanced planning and 
slow responsiveness to changing requirements periodically overload 
training facilities thus lessening their effectiveness and , con-
versely, periodically allow them to be idle, thereby reducing 
I 
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their efficiency . 
4. Overtraining of personnel creates morale problems. 
Personnel who have been trained to a high skill level expect to 
utilize th:ts skill when assigned to an operating unit . However, 
since this high skill level is not required anct · utilized, person-
nel are frustrated, motivation is reduced and morale is impaired . 
It is readily apparent, therefore, in this day of increasing 
emphasis on both effectiveness and efficiency throughout the 
Department of Defense, that an increased level of efficiency must 
be achieved in the Polaris Training Program. Steps to achieve 
this increased level of efficiency have already been taken within 
the program. These procedures for increased efficiency while 
maintaining effectiveness will be discussed in the next chapter . 
In addition, additional procedures to improve both effectiveness 
and efficiency will be discussed . 
l 
CHAPTER IV 
RECENT CHANGES IN TECHNICAL ~'lANP OHER TRAINING PROGRAMS 
The Effects of the Dillon Report 
On 29 March 1962, the Secretary of the Navy initiated a re-
view of the management of the Department of the Navy to appraise 
the effectiveness, responsiveness, and economy of the Navy and to 
recommend changes where improvements could be made.1 This review , 
which comprised a total of twenty individual studies, was the most 
comprehensive review of the management processes and struct ure of 
the Department of the Navy since the early 1940's. The report, 
V'Jhich was completed in December 1962 and published in February 
1963.s is commonly known as the "Dillon Report" . 
One of the major studies conducted in this management review 
was the I-1:anpower I>1anagement Study. The report of this study 
stated that 
••• perhaps one of the most critical areas in need of 
attention may be identified as the "human subsystem" in 
new weapons systems development . The processes of man-
power planning and development have not kept pace with 
the Navy's research and development program. Emphasis 
• • • on the production of new hardware has far out-
stripped consideration of the human factors involved . 
Lost sight of is the fact that the major components 
of a system include not only the hardware, but the 
people, the environment in which the equipment and 
people function • • • • A system must be personnel 
feasible as well as technically, monetarily, and physi-
cally feasible . The omission of human feasibility in 
the Navy ' s development planning will produce new systems 
of a complexity which can outstrip the capabilities of 
the combat forces to use , operate, and maintain the 
systems. While • . • the Navy up to this point has been 
l NAVEXOS P-2426A, op . cit ., p . VII. 
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able to adjust to the situation, the capability to im-
provise in the future to accommodate these situations 
will become progr essively difficult . The major con-
tributing factor to this problem seems to be lack of 
complete objectivity in the Navy ' s RDT&E pl anning 
system which fails to make adequate provision for the 
human or manpower element in new developments . A 
secondary contributing factor lies in the ineffective 
operation of the lead-bureau system in carrying through 
such plans that have t aken the manpower aspects into 
consideration . Accordingly, it has been recommended 
• • • that the objectives of new weapons plannin§ be 
clarified to specifically include provision for human 
subsystem 11 development and that the responsibil ities 
• • • be clarified to assure the execution or pursuit 
of these objectives . 2 
The Study Group also found that the responsibility for train-
ing--inc l uding planning, implementation, and support--was vested 
in many diverse organizations . The dispersion of training re-
sponsibility created considerabl e confusion, duplication, and 
dil ution of the total training effort . 3 As a result of this 
study and in accordance wit h the recommendations of the "Dillon 
Report", the Chief of Naval Operations promul gated a revised 
policy designed to insure the effective coordination of personnel 
requirements and training program pl anning concurrently with 
equipment development and production . This revised policy pro-
vided the framework required to improve the technical manpower 
4 training programs . 
2Ibid ., Study 5, Vol . I., pp. 7-8 
3Ibid ., p . 9 . 
4 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Coordination of Personnel Requirements and Training 
Program with Material Developments, OPNAV I nstruc-tion 1500. BE~ 




This policy, 1u th-2 rcr>r~1 of an Jnstructlon st2ted that 
• • • the complexity of Ill)W Clt>Vt'lopments for the ~2.11y and 
the urgent operational need for this material malces it 
mandatory that personnel tre1ined in its 5.nstallation and 
maintenance and skilled in its operation be available in 
time for its operational introduction. Tll2 leDd time re --
qui red for personnel procurement and training is as real 
and as dem-3nding as that for developme11t and procl.JJ:'ement 
of the equipment itself. Furthermore, continuing pro-
vision for the training of replacement personnel is 
necessary. Development and implementation of personnel 
and training progPams m wt be timed Z~nd closely coordi --
nated with the development and procurement of weapons , 
equipments and systems . Clo~,e ancJ continuing liaison 
and effective coordination between all agencies in~olved 
• is essential to obtain satisfactory results. 
The instruction iJent on to say 
• information affecting total :numlJei'S of personnel, 
procurement of training equipment and media, and con-
struction or modification of training facilities should 
be incorporated into the budget cycle at the earliest 
possible tirne prior to the: opera'vional introduction of 
the new system or equipment. Concurrently, action should 
be initiated to identify new knowledge and skills re-
quired which may, in turn, necessitate changes in the 
enlisted and officer structur•e, qualifications, classi-
fications, training programs, and complements and 
allowances.6 
'rhe instruction further stated that 
• • • to nccomplish the appropriate planning for personnel 
manning and training, initial estimates are made in con-
nection with the prep~ration of the Technical Development 
Plan ••• or other appropriate planning documents •••• 
. These e~timates must be continually under review and re-
vision consistent vJith the development of the material 
concerned. At a propitious stage in the development of 
the system, weapon, or equipment, a Training Plans Con-
ference vrill be convened and c: Training Plan will be 
prepared, to set forth the personnel and training require-
ments and the course of action to be undertaken to meet 




these requirements •••• The participants at the Traini ng 
Plans Conference will be responsible for bringing to the 
conference information in their areas of cognizance • • • 
that will permit the formulation of a Training Plan •••• 
During the Training Plans Conference, consideration shoul d 
be given to equipment presently installed at training 
facilities which can possibly be replaced as the resul t of 
the introduction of the ner equipment ••.• The Navy 
Training Plan is the official plan to provide trained per-
sonnel for the equipment or system cor.cerned . The Chief of 
Naval Personnel, as the Navy's Training Authority, is res-
ponsible • . • for [ih~ preparation and overseeing the 
execution of the plan and [J.h~ coordination and prepara-
tion of required changes,7 
Responsibilities of the various bureaus and offices of the 
Navy Department were outlined in detail Nhen the Chief of Naval 
Operations promulgated the above policies . All agencies con-
cerned with new systems and personnel were required to examine 
areas which had caused problems in the Polaris Training 
Program. One of the steps taken was to insure that initial 
production of training equipment was to be included in the ini-
tial procurement of equipment for the system. 
The Developing Agency is now required to provide the Navy ' s 
Training Authority, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the oppor-
tunity to participate in matters relating to personnel and 
training in the preparation of Technical Development Plans and 
any changes that may affect the personnel area during the de-
velopment of these plans. The Developing Agency is also 
required to convene a Training Plans Conference, wherever fea-
sible, at least three years before a system or equipment is 
introduced into the fleet . 
7Ibid ., p . 3. 
The Developing Agency must inform Bupers of the maintenance 
concept, the number of planned procurements and installations 
and a tentative priority of allocations prior to convening the 
Training Plans Conference. In addition, the Developing Agency 
is required to provide a training media 11 to BuPers in the form 
of technical documentation and draft technical manuals to sup-
port initial training. Follow-on documentation required to 
maintain training current ·with equipment configuration must also 
be provided in a timely manner.8 
The Chief of Naval Personnel, as the Navy ' s Training 
Authority, is charged with the following responsibil ities and 
duties:9 
1. Participate in the preparation of the personnel and 
training aspects of Technical Development Pl ans . 
2. Refine the preliminary personnel estimat es and deve l op 
detailed qualifications for personnel and training requirements . 
3 . Determine the feasibility of supporting new equipment 
developments within the scope of the Navy ' s current and future 
personnel potential. 
4 . Prepare and update when necessary, a recommended 'Train:-
ing Plan based on agreements reached at the Training Plans 
Conference. 
5. Act as overall manager for th de t ails of implementa-
tion and execution of the Training , institute corrective a ction 
8Ibid . , p . 5 . 
9Ibid. 
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when necessary and coordinate the corrective measures of other 
Navy Bureaus and Offices . 
6 . Provide guidance for the implementation or a responsive 
reporting system necessary t o maintain positive monitoring con-
trol of each Training Plan . 
This instruction (OP NAV INST 1500 . 8E ) provides adequate 
guidelines for the implementation of an effective and respon-
sive managem nt system designed to coordinate and implement the 
Navy ' s personnel needs effectively. It also provides for inputs 
to this management sys tem by other activities such as the fleet 
and other material commands. One of the more significant re-
quirements of this instruc t ion is t he requirement that a Project 
Officer be designated in each major Office or Bureau t o assist 
in the development, coordination and implementation of each 
Training Plan . Among the Project Officer ' s responsibili ties 
are the following:lO 
1. He shall acquire a l{nowl edge of the equipment/system 
concerned in sufficient detail to insure that all training re-
quirements are known and considered. 
2 . He shall prepare and promulgate inforrnation that is the 
responsibility of his organization. 
3. He shall attend Training Plan Conferences prepared to 
represent the position of his organization regarding training 
and per~onnel. 
4. He shall act as a coordinator wi·thin his organization 
10 6 Ibid ., p. • 
i 
for al~ matters concerning the particular Training Plan and as 
contact point for agencies xternal to his organization regard-
ing t he Training Plan. 
5. He shall monitor and report the px•ogress of training as 
set forth in the Training Plan and inform t he responsib l e Project 
Manag rs of other activities of any problems, slippages or 
changes to the Training Plan. 
This assig~~ent of Project Officers has been instrumental 
in the development of a more effective management system designed 
to insure that the Navy ' s trainin(S requirements are met effec-
tively and efficiently . The Polaris Training Program is under 
the cognizance of the BuPers Submarine Program !-ianager (Pers A41). 
He is responsible for all manpower resources (less Nuclear 
Power Personnel) assigned to submarines and submarine support 
activities. The Submarine Program Manager is responsible for the 
coordination and monitoring of the total BuPers effort in sup-
port of the Polaris Training Program . This responsibili t y 
includes t he identification of specific problems, insuring that 
appropriate corrective action is defined and initiated and t hat 
status reports to top management within BuPers and other inter-
ested offices outside of the Bureau are prepared and submitted 
in a timely and accurate manner . ll 
The Submarine Program Manager is assisted by a project team 




composed of personnel from the various sections of the Bureau of 
Naval Personnel and other Navy activities . The team members are 
responsible for the effective implementation of plans and policie s 
which support the training program within their urea of responsi -
bility, the timely reporting of present or anticipated difficul-
ties to the Program Manager and any other special assignments 
required by the Program Manager and within their functional 
::trea . 12 
This Program Management Team has functioned more or less in 
accordance with the guidelines provided . The degree of coordi-
nation between team members and between the team and other Navy 
activities, however, has not developed to a level which insures 
effective program management . Problems of effective co~aunica­
tions, qualification and quantification of requirements and 
results, and an inadequate staff for the Program Manager have re-
duced the effectiveness of this team . 
In addition, a project oriented organization working across 
functional lines has not been accepted universally by the project 
team members . As a result, functional interests often override 
project interests and reduce the effectiveness of the project 
management team . 
The small size of the Program Manager's staff makes it diffi-
cult for him to exercise the degree of control, coordination, and 
appraisal required to insure the effective operation of his 
12I bid . 
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it cited the ne~d f~:r· information aDs~ssing the impact of ,;eapons 
system development modificatio! s on po:<....,30;111el support :r-...;quire-
14 ments . Th::; navy, therefore , had to take significant and 
productive :Jt:::ps towr..rd the automation of' an information system 
in order to provide firmer managerrwnt cont:eol over p - rsonncl 
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.. rcs(;::.:::. ... c~:t team, under the directioil of the BuP-...rG New 
Develop.i1ents Research Bj_"'anch, conducted a deta.:led systems · 
analysis study of' the manage:nent of tl1e enli,"}ted. personnel re-
quirements to operate and mainta.:;_n the complex weapons sy~tem:.. 
lC:: 
being .:;.ntroduc~d in tl1e Nav;y- . -? 'l'he Polaris training program was 
used u.s a mvdel for this ;.;tudy . 'l'he study demonstrated the feas i -
b:!..lity of computcx•izing an infor-mation system thet could 
si15nificantly asnist the program mc..nager in the accomplishment of 
his manpovJ&r management functions . 
!m informacion system knmm an the Computerized Jl.d.vanced 
l3NAVEXOS P-2426A , op . c i t . , p . 112 . 
14c . R . Becl{, "CAPRI and TDrJMS Programs Offer Key to Personnel 
Planning 11 • Arm d :t~'orces Management, (August, 1967) , p . 20 . 
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PersoPnel Requirements and Inventory Information System (CAPRI 
resulted from this study . The original concept of CAPRI was a 
system to manage manpower functions throughout the life cycle of 
a new weapon or support system . This life cycle spans t he pe-
riod from the issuance of a General Operational Requirement (GOR) 
for a new system through the final retirement of the last opera-
tional model of the system . 16 The overall objective of the 
CAPRI system was to insure that at the time each unit of a wea-
pons or support system becomes operational, its crew is ful l y 
trained and ready to operate it properly . rrhe specific design 
~bjectives of the CAPRI system were as follows :17 
1. The integratlon of BuPers planning, development and 
production of a personnel subsystem for eaca new weapons syst em 
introduced in the Navy . 
2 . The close and continuing coordination of the personnel 
subsystem planning v-Jith the overall new vleapons system pl anning . 
3 . The summarization of the personnel subsystem develop-
ment and production plans for all new weapons syst ems t o provide 
more timely and accurate information on the total current and 
~ h 
.l.:JE . A. Lynch "Management Information Systems in .Support of 
Manpower Planning f, in V.l . N . Jessop, (Ed .). Manpower Planni ng, 
NATO Science Committee Conference Proceedin~~' (New York : 
American Elsevier Publishing Co . , Inc . ,-rg5bf, p . 129 . 
16Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel , 
Personnel Resear·ch Division, The Operational CAPRI System, Vol . 
1, Operations Research Inc . , silver Spring, I'1arylana, (November, 
1964), p . 3 . 
17Beck, loc . cit . 
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anticipat ed billet requirementa compared to the perso~~el i nven-
t ory for these new systems . 
4 . The computerization of personnel and training r equir e-
ments data to provide more current, detailed and meaningf ul data . 
5. The computerization of' the progress reporting on the 
Dtatus of the personnel devel opment and production pl an t o pro-
vide personnel pl anners with more rapid end accurate progress 
information . 
6 . The establ ishment of a CAPRI /COST syst em to provide 
estimates of and control ove r costs of new weapons system pe r son-
nel support . 
7. The compatibility of the cystem \.·ii th other Navy control 
systems such as PERT and with the organizational nnd functional 
responsibil ities of CNO, the N&vy Management O!'fice , Material 
Commands and BuPers . 
As previously stated, CJ',PRI was designed a:-; ;; system to man-
age manpm.'ler functions throuGhout the li e cyc l e (bot h the d.evel -
opr.1cnt and production ph&.ses ) of c:. weaponE or support system. 
Similarly, the l ife cyc l e of c... personnel sub syster.1 can be divided 
into b1o distinct ph2.ses of deve:.opment and production . The 
former is the period betv!ecn the issuance of a GOR :'or' a new sys-
tem and the establishment of the :~pecial schools ~;hich are to 
train the men to maintain and operate the ne1·1 syi3tem . The pro-
duction phase bcginc v1i th the ansignrnent of trainc~es to a Navy 
school and continues throut;h the initial bui.ldup of personnel to 
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man the system, the meeting of replacement personnel needs and 
ends wl1en tl1e sys·t;em is phased out of se:t."vice. 
In order to carry out the management and control functions 
required in each of these phases effectively, two distinct CAPRI 
subsystems were proposed, the Network Planning and Analysis {NP&A ) 
subsystem and tl1e Billets and Inventory (:a&r ) suosystem.18 The 
NP&A subsystem was directly concerned \d th the development phase 
and the B&I subsystem with both the development and production 
phases of the personnel subsystem lii' cycle . 
The NF'&A subsystem is essentially an adaptation of the Pro-
gram Evaluation and Reviev,J 1'ecnnique (PER·r) to per·sonnel program 
management functions. T.e interdependencies and interrel ations 
of the efforts riithin BuPers and oetween BuPers and other activi-
ties, such as tne Developing Agency, in the planning and devel-
oping of a personnel system can be aepicted effectively by such a 
networlc technique. This technique identifies and defines each 
task required i'or the deve l opment of the personnel subsystem con-
curently with the hardware development . :rhis facilita tes the 
matching of personnel and hardware development milescones . Once 
the estimated time to achieve the tasks required for each mil e-
stone is uetermined 3 a total program schedule can be prepared . 19 
This data can be computerized to provide r·eports showing the 
required start and completion 'cir11es for each l-<:.sk, tbE: "critical 
------- -- --- ---- ------ -- --- -----------------
18~!:~ Operation~_l CAPR_~_System_, op~cit . , p. 3. 
19tynch, op • . cit . , p . 223. 
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path 11 through the network, and !fslack 11 time available. The 
periodic updati.ng of' this data permits t;he plan to be modified 
as better or additional information becomes available. This up-
dating, as well as other changes to the sGhedule; will be reflect-
ed automatically in a nevJ computer generated. management report 
showing the effect of these changes on the other activlties in 
the network including the effect on the final project completion 
date. 20 
The periodic reporting system provided by the CAPRI {NP&A ) 
planning subsysteQ can be used by the personnel program manager 
and his project team to review progress, to locate program areas 
requiring management decision and action, to pinpoint responsibi-
lity for this action and to provide information on the overall 
status of the program. Specific areas that require monitoring 
during this development phase ar·e basic personnel research_, per-
so:t·mel requirements, personnel selection.., development of necessary 
curricula, training aids, manuals, equipment and facilities. 21 
The primary function of the CAPRI Billet and Inventory sub-
system is to provide management information during the personnel 
subsystem production phase. The subsystem provides the current 
and projected personnel requirements status once the personnel 
billets i'or each weapons system has been detCi!rmined . Modifica-
tions to these personnel requirements that result from changes to 
---- ----- -- ------ ---- -- -- - -- -- --·---- -- -------~-- ---------
20rbio. 
21Ibid . , p. 220. 
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installation schedules, number of installations, manning level s 
and personnel inventory levels are entered into the B&I subsystem 
periodically. As a result of this updating, shortages or over-
ages of personnel are identified promptly and necessary action 
can be taken to correct these deficiencies . The B&I output re-
ports provide the project team with information regarding person·-
nel inventory exceptions, inventory utilization, expected current 
losses, computed loss factors and the required school inputs to 
satisfy the overall personnel requirements by billet . 22 I t also 
permits the comparison of personnel training requirements with 
training school output capability indicating any necessary or 
feasible reprogramming actions. 
The B&I subsystem can also generate inventory information on 
total functional categories as wel l as on specific weapons sys-
tems . This provides personnel planners with information rel ating 
to the impact of a new weapons system personnel requirements on 
a particular classification of enlisted personnel . 23 I n addition, 
the system is flexible enough to permit the determination of per-
sonnel requirements before and after the weapons system becomes 
operational and on through its entire life . 24 
In summary, the CAPRI system for the management of technical 
manpower requirements assists the program manager in the basic 
management functions of planning, organizing, directing, measuri ng 
and controlling . The primary emphasis during the development 
23Ibid . 24 Beck, op . cit ., p . 20 . 
I 
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phase of a program is on planning . During this phase, basicall y 
through the use of the CAPRI ~"P&:A subsystem_, ob,jectives of the 
personPel subsystem are dat r'IIlined, various ulternatives are 
for~ulated and examined and decisions ure made as to what is re -
quired and how to achieve it within the availatle t ime and funding 
constraint~ . 25 
Once the produetlon phase. of the program is renched, the 
r.1anagemcnt emr;ha.::;;ls ;:;hifts to maintaining an equilibrium between 
personnel or billet requlrements and the efficient distribution 
of the available an~. trained inventory of personnel. This is 
a ccompJ.ished Nith th CAPRI P.&I subsystem . This subsystem per-
forms speclf le; medSUl'ern""~nts of the inventory and requirements 
variables and indicutes where prompt and ti~ely adjust ments in 
26 
the pe:."'sonnel pipel.lne flov-1 ::;hould be 1:1ade . 
t. primary element of the CAPRI system design is the concept 
of a personnel progJ.'arn manager Hhich superimposes a project 
management oPgantzation ove a functional o:::>ganizc:.tion. This 
e 8ment of the CAPRI system parallels the CNO requirement for a 
personnel proc;ram manager . 
C.I\.PRI t:11.L:> prov.tdes the i""lf:)rmation sys"::e11 that the program 
manager nee~s in order to coordinate ~nd integrate eff~ctively 
all :;he BuPers fuJ.1ction .: relc:tP.:J to his particul er program . The 
structure of this information syste1n permits the app lication of 
the "management by exception 11 techr1iqv.e and he l ps to reduce the 




manager 's workload to a more manageable l evel. Conversely, t he 
CAPRI system also provides information to the Developing Agency 
and to other commands involved ln the program in order that they 
can cupport the:i.P part of the personnel subsystem requirements . 
CAPRI \'Jas implemented in 1964 in some 25 developmental or 
semi-operational projects. Itc emphasis, in these prcjects, was 
directed solely to the critical-skill technicians required to 
man the ne~J weapons systems. In theory 3 the system was the 
answer to the majority of the personnel program manager ' s infor-
rr.ation needs . 
&ince that time, however, acceptance and utilization of the 
system has been relatively slow . For example, the system is 
utilized by the Submarine Program Manager but not by the majority 
of his "project team " . The Enlisted Submariner Distribution Desk, 
Pers B2113, does not utilize CAPRI but uses another computerized 
inventory systern . This results in a communication problem be-
tween the program manager and his project team, since the t wo 
systems often generate different inventory numbers . Both systems 
measure the same inventory, but the standards and interpretat ion 
of the numbers differ between Pers A and Pers B. 27 
As a result 3 training requirements projected by Pers A and 
Pers B are often poles apart . The reconciliation of the require-
ments then becomes an involved task . Once the numbers are recon-
ciled, the necessity for immediate, inefficient and disruptive 
27 Inter·view with LCDR Painter, Pers B2113-1 , 18 .January 1968. 
char.ges to training s chedules will often follow. These training 
schedule changes could have been avoided, or at least reduced, if 
a common or compatible information system had been utilized by all 
members of the project team . 
Thus, even with the adoption of a program manager organiza-
tional concept and the adoption of an automated personnel informa-
tion system designed to make it possible for the program manager 
to perform his task effectively and efficiently, the results of 
these systems have not been impressive. 
A stronger committment to t he program manager concept and the 
adoption of a uniform lnfonnation system is required by BuPers be -
fore the full potential of this system can be realized. Whether 
or not this can be accomplished without additional pressure from 
top BuPers management or from the CNO/SecNav to force full com-
pliance with CNO policies and uniformity of information systems 
is problematical. 
The Polaris/Poseidon Training Schedule and Equipment Requirements 
As has been stated previously, the training requirements for 
the Polaris program have been relatively stable since 1964 . How-
ever, this period of stable requirements is destined to be short-
lived . The conversion to Poseidon training while maintaining a 
Polaris training capability is scheduled to begin in early 1969 . 
This partial conversion from Polaris to Poseidon will require an 
effort that will practically equal tne magnitude of the original 
Polaris program. In essence , Poseidon will be a new weapons 
, 
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system replacing approximately three-quarters of the present 
Polaris capability. Poseidon, for planning purposes, is being 
treated as a new weapons system and not as a modification of an 
existing system. 
In order to prevent the reoceurance of the problems that 
occurred during the development of the initial Polaris training 
program, the Special Projects Off'ice (SPO) Training Branch (SP15) 
has developed a computerized information system designed to solve 
or reduce training equipment problems. This computer program 
was developed with the intent of providing SPO equipment planners 
with the information required to keep them current with the 
scheduled SSBN overhauls and the equipment delivery and installa-
tion dates at the various training sites. 28 
The "Polaris/Poseidon Training Schedule and Equ:l,pments 
Requirementsn (PPTSER) document was the end result of the com-
puterized planning program. The PPTSER has provided program 
planners (personnel, equipment, and tactical) with rapid and ac-
curate information concerning total program requirements and the 
ability to meet t hese requirements. 
The basic source document for the PPTSER is the SPO System 
for Projection and Analysis (SPAN). This classified document, 
which is updated periodically, lists all the key program dates 
and requirements such as submarine overhaul dates and equipment 
modifications and availability schedules. 
2Boepartment of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel$ 'PPTSER 
Program-Progress Report, (Washington : PRL, December, 1967), p. 1. 
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The original PPTSER provided training equipment planners with 
excellent and timely information of training equipment require-
ments. However9 as the Poseidon program was being developed, it 
became apparent that an expansion of the PPTSER. to include student 
loading information would assist the personnel planner in prepar-
ing and scheduling conversion and replacement training courses for 
Poseidon while maintaining the required level of effort for 
Polaris. 29 
As a result of the PPTSER expansion, the student loading re-
quirements at the Guided Missile School are provided on a weekly 
basis for each Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC), on a 
fiscal-year basis by NEC and total student loading on a weekly 
30 basis . This information provides the personnel planners with 
greater visibility for long-range planning of instructional, per-
sonnel, and facilities requirements, since PPTSER is based on the 
SPAN document which is structured to conform to the DOD Five-Year 
Defense Plan (FYDP). FYDP is designed to coordinate long-r ange 
military planning with short-range budgeting and projects programs 
and their costs for five years with major military forces, such as 
Polaris/Poseidon, projected an additional three years . Thus 
training requirements, as stated in the SPAN document , can be pro-
jected for eight years through the use of the information provided 
by the PPTSER. 
29Ibid . 
30Ibid . 9 p . A-1 . 
.. 
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This information has just become available to the training 
equipment planners in SPO and to the personnel planners in BuPe s . 
Pers C-11 (the Instructional Standards and Materials Division of 
Bu.Pers responsible or the direction and coordination of Nav 
schools conducting submarine training) uses this data in formula-
ting the training require ent~ for its various Polaris/Poseidon 
training activities. 
The irony of this system 1s tlat it duplicates , to a large 
extent, the information that can be provided by the CAPRI sys em . 
Therefore, even if th sy tem runctions efficiently~ it rurth r 
compoun s the roblem or trying to match and correlate th infor-
mation being .used b~ other BuPer d~visions . Pers A41, (the 
submarine Program ~tanager) uses CAPRI as its information system, 
Pers B2ll3 (The Submarine Program &lliste Distribution Branch) 
uses th BuP rs standard enlisted distribution report an· ers e-
ll (The SUbmarin~ Program Instructional Standards and Materials 
Branch) use PPTSER. All these information ay terns partially 
duplicate., overlap~ and compensate eac1 other . However, each 
system us s differ nt variables nd :tnp t factors with their out-
p ts being diff rent rom one anoth r . 
only one systems the CAPRI syatem, was de 1gned specifically 
to handle the entire dev lopment and production phase of a tech-
nical manpower information system . The other two systems are 
mo limited in cope although both can provide ome us fu infor-
mati n.. Minor revisions of the CAP I sy tem woul enable it o 
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provide all the information required by all activities concerned 
with a personnel training program. Unless this is done, the pro-
liferation of information systems to provide management assistance 
will result in more confusion, uncert ainty,, duplication of effort, 
and inefficiency of the Polaris/Poseidon training program . This 
duplication of information systems, where one system could per-
form the task satisfactorily and also improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of this training program, is one of the more serious 
weaknesses of the Polaris/Poseidon Training Program. 
Before discussing how the organizational and informational 
structure for the Polaris/Poseidon Training Program could be im-
proved, more basic questions have to be examined . These questions 
are: (1) how much and what type of training is really required for 
the proper operation and maintenance of technical equipment? and 
(2) how can this training objective be determined? This actually 
forms the basis of two of the essential elements of a training 
plan: (1) how long is the training pipeline? and ( 2) what output 
is required from this pipeline? These questions will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
TECHNICAL TRAINING COURSE REQUIRmt8NTS 
Efficiency Criteria for Polaris Training Courses 
A prevailing and compelling objective, common to the majority 
of military personnel planners, is "cost-effectiveness". f.1any 
organizational schemes and information systems have been developed, 
tested and implemented in order to realize this "cost-effective-
ness" objective . During the last few years, the Polaris Training 
Program has relied heavily on the program manager to achieve its 
objective of adequate training at least cost. As has been indi-
cated in previous chapters, the organization and information sys-
tems required to achieve the "cost-effectiveness" objectives are 
available . These systems are capable of providing the Navy with 
an effective Polaris Training Program if utilized properly . 
An effective training management system, however, does not 
guarantee that efficiency will follow automatically in both the 
development and production phases of manpower training . For ex-
ample, an effective management system designed to manage a train-
ing program for Polaris Submarine Fire Control Technicians is not 
efficient if the technicians are instructed on both Polaris and 
Minuteman Fire Control Systems . Although this example is somewhat 
exaggerated, it is intended to emphasize the point that specific 
objectives for each training course are required . 
Once the specific objective of each technical course is de-
termined, a systematic training course can be developed to satisfy 
these objectives . These course requirements or objectives are not 
, 
easy to determine. A statement such as "the training objective is 
to prepare a man to operate and maintain the Polaris Fire Control 
System effectively" is rather meaningless, although it does in 
fact set forth the proper objective . The basic question that re-
mains to be answered by such a broad statement is "What kind and 
how much training is needed in order to meet the technical system 
requirements?" 
The determination of these requirements could lead easily to 
a deep involvement in the field of behavioral science . It is not 
the intention of this paper to delve into this field to any 
appreciable degree . Rather, primary emphasis will be on the 
"what" of learning instead of 11how 11 learning is acquired . 
Actually, there has been a large quantity of published research 
and field activity concerned with the behavioral aspects of mili-
tary training. Experience leads to the hard conclusion, hm'l'ever, 
that its impact upon actual training practice has been somewhat 
1 
marginal . As a consequence, per•sonnel program managers have 
often s~ent more time and attached more importance to the task of 
administering numbers of men entering and leaving training estab-
lishments in order to meet manning commitments than to the exami-
nation of the objectives, contents and effectiveness of t he 
2 
training courses themselves . 
1D. Wallis, "The Technol ogy of Mil i t ary Training 11 in W. N. 
Jessop, (Ed). op . cit . , p . 82 . 
2Ibid . 
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Basically, then, once a workable personnel management and 
management information system in support of manpower planning has 
been developed, certain variables relating to the training itself 
have to be determined . These variables are required as inputs to 
the overall plan in order to determine such things as the length 
of the training pipeline, how many students are needed in this 
pipeline, who can be assigned to this training, and how the effec-
tiveness of this training is maintained while meeting "cost-
effectiveness" criteria . The above can be expressed in a series 
of questions that the manpower planner must answer if the program 
manager is to have an effective and efficient training program. 
The questions are as follows: 
1. What skill level is required before the technician can 
perform his operational tasks properly? 
2. How long should it take the trainee to acquire this skill 
level provided that he meets a certain intellectual and skill 
level prior to undergoi ng training? 
3. Do all trainees have to be exposed to the same depth and 
length of training? 
4. How can uniform entrance criteria for advanced courses be 
established? 
5. How can trainee performance be evaluated during and aft er 
completion of the training course? 
6 . How can the performance evaluation results be factored 
into the training courses to eliminate potential deficiencies? 
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1 . How can proficiency be maintained after the technician 
completes his initial formal training? 
8. How can proficiency be expanded to permit the technician 
to handle equipment modifications and procedural changes effec-
tively after being assigned to an operating unit? 
The above questions cover most of the variable factors that 
the personnel planner must answer in one form or another before 
an effective and efficient training program can be devel oped . The 
management systems developed to date have not provided satisfac-
tory answers to these questions . It will be necessary to direct 
efforts outside the present manpower information systems before 
these questions can be answered satisfactorily . These answers , 
then, can be used as the necessary input variables for a manpower 
information system such as CAPRI . Actually, these questions have 
usually been answered in one form or another . The answers , how-
ever, were often based on inadequate data . 
Very few attempts have been made to provide a more objective 
training course structure derived through the process of scienti-
fic inquiry . As a result, Polaris manpower resources have , at 
times, been utilized inefficiently . The courses have provided in-
struction at a level above that necessary for the trainee to 
accomplish his task and negl ected areas of instruction that he 
should have received. 
Situations occurred frequently where much of the training re-
ceived by the trainee was not required for his particular future 
.. 
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assignment and neglected areas of training that he needed . An 
actual case will serve to exemplify this problem . In 1963, BuPers 
promulgated a rating change which specified that the Polaris 
would be the only program that would require a Missile Technician 
(MT) rate. Prior to this decision, the MT 11A11 school at GMS had 
provided both the submarine and surface forces with "A" school 
graduates . This basic course did not prepare the trainee desig-
nated to enter the Polaris training program adequately . Because 
of this inadequate background, particularly in basic computer and 
inertial theory, it was necessary to teach him these basic funda-
mentals prior to starting the Polaris Missile Technician course . 
This additional training required an eight-week instructional 
period. 
When it was learned that the MT "A" school's output would be 
utilized exclusively by the Polaris program, a curriculum change 
which would improve the school ' s output was expected from BuPers . 
This change did not materialize . Therefore, the Guided Missile 
School's FBM Department took the initiative and formulated a new 
curriculum structured to provide the student with the basic funda-
mentals required for the more advanced Polaris missile courses . 
The school determined that the MT 11A11 courses could be shortened 
by the deletion of instructional material that was not required as 
a prerequisite for Polaris training . In addition, it was deter-
mined that the material contained in the eight-week introductory 
computer and inertial theory course could and should be included 
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in the basic IvlT "A" course. 
The result was a proposal by the school to BuPers tha~ a new-
curriculum be adopted. This curriculum combined the two courses 
into one basic course, eliminated extraneous material from the 
previous 6ourses, produced a better qualified 11A11 school output 
and reduced the training time required from 32 to 22 weeks. This 
represented a ten-weeks-per-student savings . It also decreas d 
instructor and facilities requirements . The proposal was accep-
ted by BuPers, implemented by GMS, and improved the effectiveness 
and efficiency of that portion of the Polaris Training Program 
substantially. The foregoing example demonstrates that a sys-
tematic objective analysis of the technician~~ future tasks to 
determine the composition of training courses is necessary . 
Otherwise, inefficiencies in training and in the utilization of 
manpower resources will occur. 
Although most Polaris courses appear successful in the 
achievement of present training objectives, there is a lack of 
direct relationship between course content and realistic job re-
quirements or training objectives. This is exemplified, in some 
cases, by overemphasis of theoretical course content at the ex-
pense of practical instruction, the retention of traditional 
subject matter in a course as a matter of precedent or 11nice to 
know" rather than on a basis of a demonstrated need and the vol-
ume of subject matter presented may be too great for reasonable 
comprehension and retention by students. Training personnel 
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generally recognize these problems and usually make continuing 
efforts toward the reappraisal of training course content . in term.s 
of increased orientation toward actual job requirements. 3 Despite 
these efforts, discrepancies exist in the courses between the 
training methods and the training objectives thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of the training and often increasing its cost. 
One of the primary reasons for the existence of discrepancies 
between the training methods and the training objectives is that 
too often the training methods are generated from composites of 
past methods which seem to suit the new requirement. The conduct 
of a Job Task Analysis is a more systematic method of determining 
training objectives. The purpose of this analysis is to deter-
mine the types, numbers, and the sequence of duties that operators 
and maintenance personnel may be expected to perform on a system. 
The data developed from this Job Task Analysis can then be used 
to determine t he number, knowledge and skill requirements for 
personnel who operate and maintain the system. The level of de-
tail of this analysis varies significantly with the stage of sys-
tem development apd the amount of prior experience with similiar 
systems. Usually, detailed concepts of operator functions and 
actions can be estimated and deduced logically from a functional 
analysis of the system. However, m.3.intenance personnel functions 
3Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Personnel 
Research Laboratory, Polaris to Poseidon-Personnel and Training 
Implications, Report prepared by w.c. Fisher for the I7th FBM 
Training Conference, (vfashington: PRL, 7 February, 1967), p. 15. 
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wil l depend, in large measure, upon the maintenance philosophy in-
corporated in the system design and is tied very closely to actual 
hardware . Preliminary determination of skills and technical know-
ledge required to perfo1~ tasks can be accomplished before and 
during the development of the tactical equipment design • 
This information may not provide all the data required but 
will serve to design training courses better suited to meet the 
training objectives or requirements. All Job Task Analysis are 
conducted with a primary goal of using the data to design a train-
ing program which will provide activities with personnel who can 
do the job adequately and who can meet the required personnel per-
formance standards much in the same way as the equipment is 
4 
required to meet precise performance requirements . Thus, an out-
put requirement for training can be established and the training 
tailored to meet this requirement . 
The Job Task Analysis process is a useful tool which helps 
to determine the skill level to which the trainee has to be in-
structed in order that he may perform his task properly. The 
determination of the subject matter, the amount of subject matter 
and the depth of instruction required helps to resolve the ques-
tion about the time element needed to produce a trainee with an 
acceptable skill level . 
Related to the above is another area which influences strong -
ly the level, depth, and length of training courses . This 
question is whether or not all trainees should be exposed to the 
4 Ibid . , p. 17 . 
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same amount of training. That is, would it be feasible and de-
sirable to provide less training to the junior technician and more 
to the senior, more responsible technicians? This question pre-
sents the personnel planner with a difficult and involved 
decision. This decision would be even more difficult in the 
Polaris program where the stated training objective is that every 
man "pull his own weight" as soon as he reports to an operating 
unit. 
Providing the junior technicians with less training than the 
senior technicians may seem incompatible with this objective . 
This is how the concept has been interpreted up to the present 
time. Is it really incompatible, however, with the training ob-
jectives? In order to answer this question, the personnel plan-
ner has to incorporate a functional training requirements 
rationale t·lith the job task analysis in order to be able ·to de-
termine the proper level of training . One possible way that this 
might be accomplished is to divide the various levels of instruc-
tion by functional training requirements. The various levels of 
instruction could be divided as follows : 5 
1. Background training-- this level of training is intended 
to provide the required background information and understanding 
that will enable the individual to understand better the total 
system. 
2. Operation familiarization training-- this level of 





training is intended to provide the individual with an apprecia-
tion of the problems incidental to the operation of equipments 
other than those for which he has prlmary responsibility. 
3. Operator training-- this level of training is ntended 
for the regular operator of the equipment. It includes detailed 
instructions and sufficient operational practice (preferably on 
real equipments) to provide the minimum level of proficiency 
needed to perform as a member of a crew . 
4. Operator maintenance training and introduction to the 
theory of operation-- this training provides the individual with 
the skills and knovt!ledge needed to perform the routine maintenance 
actions assigned to the operator of the equipment . The theory of 
operation of the equipment is covered in sufficient detail to 
enable the individual to understand hO't'I and why the equipment 
operates as it does. 
5. Routine maintenance training and theory of operation--
this level of training includes all of the regularly scheduled 
preventive maintenance that must be performed by the rate concer-
ned . Being routine, the steps in the maintenance procedures are 
usually described in the appropriate technical manuals but the 
work may involve the use of technical test equipments beyond the 
skill and ability of the non-technically trained operator. 
6. Trouble-shooting and corrective maintenance and detailed 
theory of operation - - this level of training covers the t~~e of 
73 
maintenance required to isolate defective units or elements that 
are not covered in the routine type of maintenance . The theory of 
operation covers all the elements of the equipment in detail in-
cluding the circuits and elements within replaceable units . 
This functional training division provides the personnel 
planner with a. model that helps him determine the level of train-
ing required for each techn:tcian . It is based on a Job Task Anal-
ysis ano on the expected degree of responsibility that each 
technici~n will be assigned . Obviously, if only one or two of 
these technicians are assigned to any particular activity, it may 
be necessary to train to a five or six functional level . If there 
are three or more technicians assigned to the same area, however, 
it is highly probable that some of the technicians may be trained 
to a lower level without decreasing the operational effectiveness 
of the unit. In this case, training to l evel three or four would 
be sufficient, with four the preferred level. 
The Polaris 11raining program, with its refresher training 
sites for the off-patr-ol crews, is structured ideally to take ad-
vantage of asEdgning and training personnel by functional levels . 
Aftel"' each patrol, the "off-crew" undergoes a seven-week refresher 
training period . This training period could be utilized to train 
individuals to a higher functional level . The time is already 
available to conduct this training, and, to a large extent, this 
time is utilized, at present, for this precise purpose . 
• 
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Thus, it is well within present capabilities to formalize 
this procedure and to utilize this period of refresher training 
as part of the total training program . Net savings of eight to 
fourteen training weeks per man could be realized if this system 
were adopted . The resultant decrease in the length of the train-
ing pipeline for technicians assigned to the FBM submarine wea-
pons and navigation areas could decrease personnel inventory 
requirements by as many as 200 on an annual basis . This is more 
than the number required to man five crews with these personnel . 
The foregoing proposal may very well cause many of the past 
and present FBM department heads and Commanding Officers to 
shudder and even insist that we cannot afford to cut down on 
training . Their reasoning may be that Polaris is one of the most 
complex systems yet developed and is required to operate on a con-
tinuous wartime footing . It demands, therefore, the most 
extensive and detailed of training programs . This reasoning has 
been pushed to the fore for the past eight years . Cries of an-
guish have been heard whenever it has been suggested that Polaris 
initial training was too detailed and extensive . Usually
6 
they 
have suggested, and even insisted, that additional training time 
is required . Undoubtedly, this extensive training philosophy was 
valid during the early stages of the program . At that time, few 
people knew exactly what training was required in order to operate 
and maintain re l iably a system under the conditions imposed on 
Polaris . Today, these requirements are known and they are 
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demanding compa.red to what they were in the pre-Polaris days . 
The requirements are not a.s demanding as many would make them seem 
to be , however, an they can be supported more economically with 
a selective reduction of training time . 
The fact that the majority of replacement personnel going in 
the Polaris weapons progran1 are on th<:;ir first enlistment is 
another factor that must be considered . Usual ly, this means that 
after the completion of the present extensive training courses , 
replacement personnel report aboard as the junior men in their 
assigned areas . They are , for the most part, obligated for at 
least six years of duty with more than a year already devoted to 
training . Usual ly, their first duties on board the FBM submarine 
are watch-standing duties with minor routine maintenance responsi-
bilities . Both the watch-standing and routine maintenance 
responsibilities are carried out under t he supervision of the more 
experienced personnel in the division . 
Since the junior man is not required or expected, usual ly, t o 
perform extensive maintenance , the skills that he acquired through 
extensive training are not utilized and are rapidly forgotten . 
As he gains more experience with the system and attends courses 
beb1een patrols at the refresher training sites , his technical 
knowledge and skill are i ncreased at the rate he needs to perform 
his duties as he advances in rate and responsibilities . He vlill 
absorb and retain this tro.inir.g better due to the increased oppor -
tunity to reenforce the learning process with practical experience . 
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By the time he completes his first Polaris duty tour, normally a 
period of three years, his skill level should be equivalent to the 
skill level he would have had with the more extensive initial 
training. 
The above procedur·e, as mentioned previously, is sui ted par-
ticularly to the Polaris program with its two-crew concept and 
refresher training sites . It would be more difficult to apply to 
other Navy \>Jeapons systems where the two -crew concept, refresher· 
training sites, and time are not available . The philosophy of 
determining actual requirements as they relate to both operational 
and maintenance billets is valid Navy-wide, hm-.rever, and should be 
~dhered to religiously in all training programs . 
The establishment of a uniform entrance criterion prior to 
the trainee undertaking skill-level courses has been accomplished 
in the Polaris program . The Polaris Electronic 11A11 school, lo-
cated at the Guided Missiles School, provides the same basic 
training for Electronic, Fire Control and Missile Technicians . 
This was possible because the basic requirements for the more ad-
vanced or "C" courses in these Polaris skill areas are almost 
identical • . The integration of the ET, FT, and MT 11 il" schools into 
one Polaris Field Electronic {PFE) "A" school was first conceived 
in late 1963 by the staff personnel at the Guided Missiles School . 
It was not until several years later, however, that the concept 
was approved and implemented . The benefits derived from ·i;his "A" 
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school concept are as follows: 
1 . The basic training received by the students can be 
tailored specifically to pr·epare them for the more advanced 
Polaris training . This insures that all students begin the "c" 
school vii th the same baclcground . This eliminated the requirement 
for the introductory course in computer ana inertial theory that 
had been needed to bring all students to the same knowledge level . 
2 . It provides the personnel detailers with more flexibility 
in the assignment of personrel where they are needed . A gr8duate 
of this PFE "A" school can be assigned to either the ET, FT, or 
r1T area ~ Vfith the previous segregated school arrangement, he 
could be assigned only to the specific area that he had been train-
ed for in the 11A11 school . 
3. Training time and costs are reduced because course 
material not required specifically as a background for the more 
advanced Polaris 11 C11 traini g has been eliminated . 
Since more and more of the Navy's technicians require an 
electronic background with emphasis on computers, it is possible 
that more t:A 11 schools could be int1egrated to realize the same 
benefits realized in the Polaris program. This integration might 
be somewhat more difficult to achieve in non-Polaris areas but is 
well within the realm of possibility. 
In any training program~ evaluation procedures are required 
to determine the effectiveness of the training . ~~o areas of 
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evaluation are required . One is the evaluation or testing of the 
trainee during the course of instruction, and the other is t he 
evaluation of his perfo~C'mance after he reports to his duty stati on . 
These tHo evaluation areas are required to monitor the student s 
progress during a course against a standard and to detect defi-
cienci s in the training courses both during the student •s 
instrucJ~;ional period and after he begi ns his shipboard duties . An 
analysis of these training deficiencies woul d provide the infor-
mation or feedback required t o effect the instructional methods or 
course content changes necessary to e l iminate these deficiencies . 
During the course of instruction, eval uation procedures 
should be related directly to training objective s . Tests shoul d 
be comprehensive , requiring information f r om all phases of the 
cour se, rather than covering only the most recently compl eted in-
structional block . Greater emphasis and grading weight is 
required on performance tests which represent job activi t ies bet-
ter than -v·;ritten examinations do . In addi tion, the test s should 
focus upon distinguishing between those students above and below 
some established .:i.evel of performance proficiency . "Criterion-
referenced li rather than ''norm-referenced 11 measures should be em-
ployed to determine the extent to which students are meeting 
performance standards . 
Early identification of potential failures and the immediat e 
application of remedial measures shoul d be an integral part of the 
.-
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evaluu.tion program . Once the trairlee has compl eted the cour se , 
the eval uation of hls perfurw&uce on the job c.nd the assessment 
of' the current effectlv..::ness oi' the tl"aining course in meeting 
job requirement s shoul d be obtained I'egul arl y through an estab-
l ished feedbcJCk 1::1ystem f .r•om job env.ironments . 6 
One o£' the problems associated with mc::asuring perf ormance 
both iYl school and on the j ob i:;; the deve l opment and application 
-:>f :.:r0andard pepformance measures . A promi s i ng step in t he devel-
opment of ti1e-se standard perf o:emance measures has been t al{en '.<Jith 
the development of "Ter mi nal Per•fo:L'J11ance Objectives" . These 
TPO ' s define the skill s a11d knoiJl ede;e requ i red for t he operati on 
and 1nal ntenance of vc:.rious equi pment s on board FBM submarine s . 
They were devel oped to match t l1e broadl y defi ned philosophi es of 
FBIIi submari ne operation and maint enance . The TPO ' s spec i f y per-
sonnel devel opment requirements for t he ent i r e oper ation and 
mai nt enance task .7 
These TPO ' s or ~tandard pe r formance t ent s , can be devel oped 
in conjunction Hith the conduct of a Job Tz.slc Ana l ys i o and p r o-
vide a standard performance measure re l a t ed di r ectly to t he t a sk 
requirements . The utilizati on of t hGse TPO ' s i n s cho-:>1 and on the 
job would help to insure t hat the required skill l evel s are 
achieved and, even more i mportant, maintai ned aft e r t he student 
6 Ibid., pp . 24-25 . 
7Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, PRL, 
Termi na l Per f or mance Ob j ective s for Selected Poseidon Equipments, (PRL, November , 1967), Vol. I, p . 2 . 
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completes Z8hool. Thi;;; would form a closed loop between Job Task 
f,nalysis, Tr&ining and Performance Evaluation . This system of 
evaluation and fcedbacc could nd should be applied to eny techni-
c&l traini~g area if the full potential for effective and eff -
cient training is to be re&lize6. 
Tt~ technicians ' proficiency level can e maint£ined and 
expanded after the completion of his initial training by the judi-
ciouz applicc.tion of' on-the-job training, self-study and, in the 
case of the FBM submarine technicians, refresher tr2ining between 
patrols . The qualification programs developed by the Submarine 
Force Commanders and the conduct of periodic inspections al so pro-
vides ~ high deg:r•ee of incentive for the technician to ma::ntain 
and irr:prove his profic.:.ency. The refresher train:tng periods are 
an ideal vehicle durinL which information can be updated as 
necessriry to cover recent changes and modific tions to equipments 
and procedures . The FBiv'I subma:."'ine technicinn does have tremendous 
advantage over his non ·-FBN contemporaries in this area . 
, 
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The Development of a Technology of Training 
Briefly, then, the design, construction and operation of 
training courses must be conducted in a systematic, technological 
manner in order to obtain the required output with t he minimum in-
put. As much care and expertise shoul d be devoted to the 
pl anning, designing, constructing and operating 'of the modern 
technical training courses as is being expanded in the equipment 
and administration areas . The formal equival ent t o this care and 
expertise could be considered as the 11Technol ogy of Train1ng". 8 
By necessity, this technology of training shoul d be based 
firml y upon principles drawn from behavioral science. The utili-
z ation of proper t echnical procedures based on accepted behavioral 
science principle s coul d assist material ly in the achievement of 
an efficient as wel l as an effective training program. These pro-
per technical procedures could be conducted in the following 
chronological order when pl anning training courses:9 
1. Job Task Anal ysis or t he breaking down of the total job 
for which training is necessary into consti t uent skill ed activi-
ties. Unless and until an analysis of this kind is undertaken, 
there can be no expectation of buil ding an adequate instructional 
system for any of the component tasks. 
2. Declaration of training objectives phrased in precise 
8ho.llis , op. cit., p . 108 . 
9rbid. , p . 94 . 
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terms of the skill categories which were deemed relevant by the 
Job Task Analysis . In other words , the training objectives should 
leave no doubt as to exactly what a newly-trained man will be able 
to do . 
3. The construction of criterion tests designed to measure 
periodically the progress of '~he trainee tm..rard th accomplishment 
of the training objective and whetner or not this pr·ogress is 
within prescribed limits. 
4 . Determination of the initial :.mowledge and abilities among 
trainees required for entry in a particular trair.ing course. Thi s 
entails the setting of input '1decision-rulas !· in ord.er that the 
student inputs will be compatible wi th the output requirements . 
Clearly, no system can oper·ate efficiently wi thout setting limits 
on the inputs that it will ace 
:;>. Behavioral analysis which tells what a trainee has to do 
on the way to acqu.iring the required skill. More fo mally, it is 
the technique of interpola.ting betvJeen t he input sta te of ignorance 
or ineptitude and the final output state of knowledge or skill. 
This interpolation can be viewed. as the selection of a broad se-
quence of topics th.L ... ough which the training system will encourage 
the best accumulation of knowledge and skill. 10 
6 . Construction and trial of the trainin~ course itself can 
now be acco,nplished . Th~ course designer novJ assemb l es all the 
information ne has gatherec.. -h:r·:)ugh the previous steps and knows 
1 0Ibid ., p . 99. 
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what his inputs and outputs will be as wel l as the intervening 
steps. Then he can allocate these functions among human and 
physical training means which could be instructor-oriented on one 
side or machine-oriented on the other. The emphasis should be on 
the selection of whatever combination of teaching media from 
available resources which wil l achieve the training objectives 
most effectively and efficiently. 
1. Assessment of training effectiveness and efficiency by 
a terminal demonstration of acquired knowledge or skill during the 
course of instruction . Effectiveness can be assessed by the cri-
terion tests developed in step three . The test results will serve 
to indicate whether or not the training objectives are being met . 
Efficiency, on the other hand, is basically the economic function 
of minimizing costs entailed in achieving and sustaining the 
training objectives. True costs, therefore, can be assessed only 
when the effectiveness of the system has been established. 
8. Conservation of acquired knowledge and skill through pro-
grams of On-the-Job instruction, self-study and refresher training. 
This requires close coordination between personnel who are res-
ponsible for formal instruction at training centers and personnel 
who are charged with the responsibility of conserving and improv-
ing knowledge and skills in an operational environment. This is 
perhaps the most difficult step to achieve properly and is, con-
sequently, one of the weakest areas in the entire instructional 
sys~em. Until the fact is recognized that training does not and 
.. 
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should not cease aft er completion of a training course and until 
steps are taken to improve this area, training programs cannot 
achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency . 
The question arises , t en, as to whether or not an 11 ideal 11 
technical training course which will serve as a reliable vehicl e 
for the accomplishment of the foregoing requirements can be de-
signed . If this can be done, then the program manager will have 
a better guarantee that the variables-- such as course lengt h, 
course content, input and output requirements and resource alloca-
tions wil l be valid and can be utilized properly by his i nforma-
tlon system . 
Once th se variabl es are determined r liably and maintained 
current, the program manager ' s taslc becom s largely one of ad-
ministration of an instructional system . The instructional system 
has its builc-in corrective and updating factors . It al so has an 
information system designed t o insure that a balance is maintained 
between billet requirement s and the inventory of trained person-
nel. 
Much research has been conducted in the desiJn of an aideal 11 
training cuurs8 . There are almost as many dlffersnt designs as 
there are reoearchers and educational specialists . One such de-
sign is similiar to the g neral features of programmed l earning 
materials. 11 'l'he charac 'cel-· i.;:) tics of this instructional syst em are 
11 Ibi~. , p. 93 . 
• 
85 
as follows :12 
1. The requirem.;:mt for the clear and comprehensive state-
ment of training objectives or the final output of the system . 
2. The skills or information to be acquired is broken down 
into sequential steps, each buil ding on its predecessor and cap-
able of being handled in one cycle of the training process . The 
responses from each cycle is an intermedia e output of the train-
ing process and is an indicator of learning progress. 
3 . The development of a general~zed sequence of instruction 
which is appropriate to the type of student involved. This se-
quence can be modified as the instruction proceeds for individual 
circumstances by the control permitted through feedback indica-
tions of the student 1 s progress . 
4. The provision for an effective method of eliciting and 
recording responses from the trainee throughout each cycle of in-
struction . 
5. A method for the continuous comparison of actual learning 
with the l earning that should occur during each cycle. Different 
methods can be used for this but they should be geared to inform 
the student of the results of this comparison at the earliest 
practical moment in order to realize the full benefit from the 
comparison . 
6 . The formulating of a built-in set of decision rules which 
---·-----·- - --- ·----------
12rbid., pp. 92-93. 
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uill indicate the necessity to provide the student with confirma-
tory or corrective 1;feedback'1 and ·o introduc new or remedial 
steps toward the system's objectives. Decision rules correspqnd 
to a 11 s tratcgy" of instruction . An example of this might be to 
acontinue presenting the same item until a satisfactory response 
is register d up to a maximum of four repititions . After four 
unsatisfac~ory responses~ revert to the preceeding item" .13 
This, then, is one example of an instructional system \'llich 
could be utilized for technical mili tai'Y training . ,:,1 though this 
system is not offered as the final ansvJer in the design of an 
instructional system, it is far more systematic and analy~ic than 
the systems utilized at prel3ent . If such a system accompl ishes 
no more than to force responsible personne: to consider in a sys-
tematic manner, the requir ;nents of a tecnnical instructional 
system, an i~provenent in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
such a system should occur . 
It is interesting to note that the problem of valid training 
objective determinat;ion and t he implementation of training courses 
to satisfy tnese objectives is not limited to military training . 
The same p ob:Lem xists in industry in such a:.."eas as 1)lant main-
tenance training .14 Some industrlal activities have started to 
examine their training programs to de t ermint? how much unnecessary 
- ·--- --------- ·----
--------------
l3Ibid., p . 93. 
14J.J. Seidel, "Plant Maintenance Training", Training and 
Developi ent Journal , Vol. 21, No . 12 (.uzcember, 1967), p . 18 . 
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t raining is being conducted. The expenditure of training funds is 
being looked at systematically much like the expenditure of funds 
for plant and equipment . In addition, training is viewed as being 
valid only to t!1e extent that the presented knowledge and skills 
are .C'equired c..nd p!"'acticecl in performing t he vwrk . 15 The equip-
mcnt to be ope.cated and maintained determines the knov'Iledge and 
skills :..'eCiuired. whicl:~ ln tul'n, is the one valid source for de-
termination of tra ining needs . 
Here aga.in, as in the mllltar·y, ther·e is a g O\'Jing awareness 
of t he need to de te rmine t!"'alning objectives, the end products of 
training. They are not the trainJ.ng il.iself, yet craining course 
designer::; will often c;onfusc the things chey intend tv do and 
course Jescrip tivns wi tlJ. t:c-diniug objectives . Thl~ idea is not to 
brain just to be tl""a :i.ning but tv achieve a ter-minal performance 
vb jecti ve. The wel l kn01m industrial necessi t y of '1increased pro-
duction" (more learning) at 11decreased cost 11 (less teaching) is 
forcing industl"'Y to :i.n..,pect and. .t."'·Zvise theil~ t:calning programs . 16 
The instructional methods and training cou~oe design advo-
cated by some oeg.nents of industry as a I'esul t OJ.' this inspection, 
parallels clo::.ely the training program design described earlier . 
The exchange of information bet-;veen the milita:i:'y and industry 
about this method of trnlning course design could benefi t both 
1 5rbid . 
l 6 c .B . Off and L .D. Bouten, 111rraining Program Design 11 , 
Training ana Developm nt Journa::., Vol . 21, No . 8 (August, 1967), p:-r 
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parties in the achievement of training effectiveness and effi-
ciency. Military personnel p l anners, therefore, shoul d not 
overlook this potential source of information, since the lessons 
learned by industry could ncsls t significantly in t11 proper de-
sign of tt techr!ical training prograr:1. 
CHAPTER VI 
AN INTEGRATED TECHNICAL MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAM 
Polaris/Poseidon Training 
Since its inception in the late 1950's; the Polaris Training 
Program has been an effective program . The fact that Polaris is 
considered as the heart of our nuclear deterrent capability and 
that the program has provided this capability on a highly reliabl e 
basis is well known and documented. The primary reason for this 
enviable record has been the men who have maintained and operated 
this system under wartime condi~ions . This fact is also well 
known and documented. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the enviable repu-
tation of the Polaris man-machine weapons system was not achieved 
without encountering and solving numerous problems . The effec-
tive marriage of man and machine, despite the many problems faced, 
is a living testimonial to the men who dedicated their time and 
effort to the program . 
It would be highl y presumptuous, however, to reflect on the 
accomplishments of the Polaris program without considering the 
methods which were utilized to achieve these accompl ishments . The 
fact that the Pol aris Training Program has achieved its objectives 
does not mean that we should be satisfied and continue the program 
as it has been conducted in the pas t . As has been not ed previous-
ly, many of the decisions made during the course of the program 
were made on the basis of expediency wit h little or no considera-
tion of the economic impact of the decision . In most cases, the 
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decision-maker had little or no choice in the matter and was con-
cerned primarily with providing Polaris with trained personnel 
regardless of cost. 
This philosophy of management, unfortunately, has a tendency 
to persist even when more efficient methods are available. Just 
because a system or procedure worked in the past does not mean 
that it is the best or only way to achieve an objective. A pro-
gram management system has to be flexible and capable of adapting 
itself readily to changing conditions, requirements, situations 
and environments . 
Polaris, in my opinion, is now at a crucial stage. Now is 
the time to review, in a systematic manner, all the aspects of 
Polaris training. This is necessary in order that the past level 
of effectiveness may be maintained and efficiency improved. An 
objective review should consider the management, information and 
training aspects of the Polaris Weapons System . 
This review has considered only the major aspects of the pro-
gram. During the course of the review, certain problems were 
discussed and possible solutions suggested. These problems and 
solutions are not meant or proposed as the only ones applicable . 
They are meant, rather, to provide a basis from which the problems 
germane to the program can be located, anal yzed and solved effec-
tively and efficiently. 
The various proposals for the improvement of the Polaris 
Training Program can now be correlated into an integrated 
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management plan . 
The present organizational system used to plan, control and 
monitor Polaris training is based on the project manager concept. 
This management concept has been practiced successfully in many 
fields of endeavor . The concept is well suited to managing pro-
grams which, by necessity, cut across standard organizational 
lines . Furthermore, this type of management system was recommen-
ded for the conduct of technical man-power training programs by 
the "Dillon Report" , the Monroe "Ad Hoc" report and by the Chief 
of Naval Operations . The management of the entire Polaris pro-
gram is based on this concept and was an important factor in the 
success of the program. 
Technically, Polaris training is conducted under this manage-
ment system . In actuality, however, the functional interests of 
the program management team often override the project interests . 
This is due, in part, to the lack of understanding of the project 
management concept by members of the management team~ the lack of 
time on the part of some members of the team to participate to the 
extent required due to other duties, and the lack of expertise 
that would enable the team members to plan, control and evaluate 
the program in a more objective fashion. 1 
Many of the project team members have not been exposed to the 
basic concepts of teaching, learning and performance evaluation to 
1Interview with Captain F.T. King, BuPers Submarine Program 
Manager, Pers A41, 20 February 1968. 
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a sufficient degree. The effective management utilization of EDP 
systems is often not practiced due to the lack of understanding 
of the capabilities of this type of equipment. 2 
Many EDP systems have been tried and found wanting because 
of t he lack of EDP systems knowledge. This has created the 
common impre sion that the systems Jere ineffective. EDP systems 
have proliferated as a result of the search for an "effective0 
system. This has generate more confusion rather than assisting 
the team in its management task. 
The solution to the above problems is not easy nor can it be 
accomplished rapidly. On the other hand, the possible solutions 
must not be ignored or merely given lip service . In order to 
realize the benefits from and to avoid the pitfalls of a manage-
ment system, the managers must have a good understanding of the 
"hows" and "whya 11 of the system. 
This indicates one possible solution for the effective use of 
the program management concept by the Polaris Training Program 
management team. That is, all team members must understand not 
only the basic factors involved in training, but they also must 
know the management system being used to achieve this training. 
Once this is accomplished, the team members will have better suc-
cess in using t he present organizational setup to the programs ' s 
advantage. 




Training Program is another area that requires attention. The 
CAPRI system seems to meet the requirements better than any other 
_system currently in use or planned. The system ' s effectiveness 
has been greatly reduced, however, by the lack of understanding 
of its capabilities, the need for better input variables and the 
failure to accept the system by all activities concerned with 
Polaris training . 
The CAPRI system is not utilized to its full capabilities 
even in the areas where it has been implemented . The important 
CAPRI Network Planning and Analysis subsystem has not been used to 
any appreciable degree by the BuPers planning section because of 
the above difficulties . 3 The scope and complexity of the Polaris 
Training Program requires a responsive and flexible management in-
formation system . CAPRI was designed for this purpose and, al-
though not perfect, could perform these functions if it was 
utilized properly and fully by the entire management team . The 
CAPRI Billets and Inventory subsystem can, over a period of time, 
assist in the statistical determination of the personnel replace-
ment factors required to maintain a balance between billets and 
personnel qualified to fill these billets. These factors can be 
projected and modified as necessary to determine future personnel 
requirements . 
Thus, the management system and a management information 
• 
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system designed specifically for this type of training program are 
available. Stronger emphasis and better understanding is required 
in order that these systemscan be implemented and utilized fully 
and properly. 
A more systematic examination of the objective, contents and 
effectiveness of the training courses is required. The information 
generated by this objective examination is necessary in order to 
provide valid input variables to the information system in addi-
tion to improving both the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
training. The use of the Job Task Analysis procedure and Terminal 
Performance Objectives will help to determine these training ob-
jectives and course contents. The formulation of a "Technology of 
Training", such as outlined in Chapter V, also will help to improve 
training efficiency. 
It is realized that the improvement of training efficiency 
cannot be accomplished overnight . It is, however, high time that 
the personnel planners take these procedures under active con-
sideration and work toward their implementation . 
This will require a basic change in Polaris training philo-
sophy. The new training philosophy is not designed to produce an 
individual \'lho is an expert in all aspects of the Polaris weapons 
system before reporting for duty. This is what we are trying to 
do at the present time. It will still produce a man, nevertheless, 
who "can pull his own weightn as soon as he reports for duty, and 
it can be accomplished with a much smaller expenditure of time and 
. 
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money. '!'he new training philosophy requires the inclusion of the 
"refresher training 11 period into the total training program. As 
stated previously., this "refresher training 11 capability provides a 
ready-built vehicle to improve training program efficiency and is 
unique to the Polaris program . 
We have seen how the Polaris Training Program can be improved . 
This improvement is not so much in t he area of program effective-
ness but in program efficiency. The management system and the 
management information system recommended are already in use . 
Better utilization of these systems., however, is required . The 
basic concepts of training and a "Technology of Training" have 
been discussed and areas indicated t hat could benefit the Pol aris 
Training Program . 
These training concepts are not new or unduly sophisticated 
but could be and should be implemented in Polaris training . More 
efficient use of the present training capabilities can be accom-
plished if the "refresher training" period is included in the 
total training program . 
The partial changeover from Polaris to Poseidon, starting in 
· early 1969, provides t he Navy ' s personnel planners with a ready 
made opportunity to appl y lessons learned from past mist akes and 
to take advantage of a better management information system for 
the design and management of a training program . Indications are 
that steps are being taken in the right direction to implement the 
majority of the recommendations considered necessary for a better 
• 
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training program. The recommendations discussed are feasibl~ and 
it is hoped that the process of implementation will be accelerated . 
It is the writer's belief that if this proposal or a similiar sys-
tem is adopted and utilized properly, the Polaris/Poseidon man-
machine complex will continue to maintain its high level of 
effectiveness with increased efficiency. 
Applicability to Other Navy Technical Training Pro~rams • 
Discussion, in this paper, of the Navy's Technical Manpower 
Training Programs has been centered primarily on the Polaris/ 
Poseidon program. In actuality, Polaris/Poseidon is a relatively 
small area of the total Navy technical training effort . Many of 
the problems encountered in the Polaris area, however, are not 
unique to Polaris. Similiar problems have been encountered in 
many other technical training programs. The solution or compen-
sation for these deficiencies in non-Polaris areas has been, on 
the whole, more difficult, because these programs did not have as 
high a priority for men, materials and funds as Polaris did. 
In addition to the priority advantage, Polaris has another 
advantage that often is not mentioned or considered . This advan-
tage is the relatively stable scheduling of the SSBN operational 
patrols. Every "Blue" and "Gold" SSBN crew makes two patrols dur-
ing a twelve-month period. The equally spaced patrols can be 
scheduled far into the future with little chance for any appreci-
able changes . The personnel rotation policies are structured to 
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permit the orderly rotation of approximately one-sixth of the crew 
after each patrol or about one-third of each crew per year. When 
a man reports to a SSBN, he can expect a three-year tour of duty 
before being transferred . In most cases, the personnel detailers 
insure that the individual has sufficient obligated service to 
serve a full tour before he is ordered aboard a Polaris submarine . 
The stable scheduling of patrols and the rotation policies in 
effect are conducive to maintaining a well trained and stabilized 
crew. 
This luxury of stable scheduling of operational periods is 
not enjoyed by the majority of the Navy ' s non-Polaris activities . 
Personnel distribution policies for these activities are keyed to 
filling vacancies in the ships rather than providing well -trained 
staLilized crews. 4 In addition to the distribution of personnel, 
the Navy has not solved the problem of advanced training for peopl e 
serving with the operating forces . If a key member of a crew is 
sent to an extended school, the ship must operate without his 
services during that period. The ship is faced with two unsatis-
factory alternatives-- either do not send personnel to lengthy 
training courses or accept a lower degree of readiness brought 
about by personnel absences . 5 
In his article, "The Canadian Cyclic System", Captain Dombroff 
4seymour Dombroff , Captain, u.s . Navy, 11The Canadian Cyclic 
System", United States Naval Institute Proceedings , January 1968, 
p . 64~ 
Ibid . , p . 65 
• 
' 
6 U. S. Navy ~ said: 
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By any criterion of effective use of men-machines 
in combination, our Navy is wasteful, even acknowledg-
ing the dubious rationale that military operations 
necessitate inefficient manpower practices . 
Whats then, should we do? Essentially, we must 
schedule ships (and squadrons) to permit a progres-
sive increase in training and readiness during the 
entire cycle between overhauls, and we must have 
stabilized cre\'ls that stay with the ships between 
overbauls. ' · · 
It can't be done? It has been done. The "in 
vivo" model-- the Canadian Cyclic System - is close 
at hand to study and to evaluate. 
The failure of the U.S. Navy to solve its man-
power management problem may have resulted from 
relying on stop-gap solutions t o piece-meal problems 
rather than finding-- as has the Canadian Navy-- a 
co-ordinated set of solutions which will make optimum 
use of both their people and the fighting units in 
which they serve . 
The Canadian Cyclic System programs al l Royal Canadian Navy 
ships and their crews for a period of sixteen months divided into 
four phases . Phase I is titled "Maintenance and Coursing 11 during 
which the ships undergo refits or overhauls and crew members at-
tend training courses. New crew members report aboard during this 
period and personnel who have compl eted their shipboard tours are 
transferred.7 
Phase II is the workup period which corresponds to the U.S . 
Navy ' s refresher training period . Phase III is the fleet phase 
when the ships are considered to be in the highest s tate of 
operational readiness . Phase IV is the "Personnel Assist ance 
6Ibid., p. 64. 




Phase 11 during which the ships are operated at a progressively 
decreasing tempo. During this phase, personnel are sent to schools 
which require more than seventeen weeks . 8 
After being in operation for three years, there is unanimous 
acclaim today in the Canadian Navy for the Cyclic System. The 
adoption of this system by the u.s . Navy would require major modi-
fications because of our size, operational commitments and 
differences in lengths of obligated service for enlisted person-
nel. The potential rewards are such that the proposal should be 
given serious consideration.9 
Viewed in this context, all the recommendations for improving 
both the management and training effectiveness and efficiency of 
the Polaris program could be applied to all other Navy technical 
training programs. Without the cyclic system, all the recommen-
dations with the exception of those related to the "refresher 
training 11 periods are feasible Navy-wide and could be adopted. 
The program manager concept and the CAPRI information system 
are already in use by other Navy Technical Training Programs such 
as the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) program. The same problem of 
inadequate implementation and understanding of these management 
tools exists in these programs much the same manner as was found 
in the Polaris Program. The problem of coordination is more diffi-
cult in many of these areas because of the division of 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid., p . 68. 
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responsibility between BuPers and the Developing Agency for 
initial training and follow-on training. 10 
An exa~ple wil l serve to illustrate this division of respon-
sibility. The Naval Ships System Command (NavShips ) has a 
Central Training Division (06T) which is responsible for training 
personnel for new systems until BuPers has established a training 
facility . Then the training responsibility shifts to BuPers . 
This means that the personnel planners in BuPers are not involved 
in the training of personnel for many of the ne~ systems until 
several years after the training for this system has been 
initiatect.11 On the other hand, BuPers has full responsibility 
for the coordination of the Polaris training from the initial 
planning stage to the phasing-out of certain segments of the pro-
gram . 
The latter method permits more effective coordination of a 
training program and reduces the arnount of redundancy necessary 
to plan and implement two different segments of a training plan . 
The problem of program continuity is eliminated and more expertise 
in the particular training area is generated. A single "Training 
Authority" can develop a more efficient training program . 
The implementation of an Integrated Technical Manpower 
Training Program will be somewhat more difficult in the 
10rnterview with Cdr . R.A. Hyde, u.s . Navy , BuPer s Submarine 




non-Polaris areas . This does not mean that such a program should 
not be considered. If the u.s . Navy is to use the cost-ef fective-
ness technique as a method for deter~ining mil itary requirements , 
it must take advantage of every possible opportunity to improve 
its level of management sophistication . Technical manpower train-




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
During the course of this paper, the Navy's Technical Man-
power Tr·aining Programs , particularly Polaris, have been examined. 
The effectiveness of Polaris trainingJ despite many obstacles, ha·s 
been proven beyond any doubts. The efficiency of the program, 
however, could be improved substantially . 
The Polaris Training Program, like many of the other Navy 
technical manpower training programs, util izes the program manage-
ment concept. This managment system has demonstrated its effec-
tiveness in many areas, both military and civilian. The full 
utilization and acceptance of the concept , an essential element 
if it is to ~tork, has not been achieved due to problems of under-
standing, parochial ism, and inadequat~ staffing . The solution to 
the above problems is obvious . 
A management information system, which is an essential ele-
ment for the management of a technical manpower training program, 
is available and in limited use . CAPRI was designed primarily for 
this type of training program and has the potential of being an 
effective management tool. As with the program management con-
cept, it has yet to realize its full potential due to lack of 
understanding, the introduction of oth~r management information 
systems , and inadequate input variables. Again , the solution to 
this problem is obvious . 
The problem of r·elating training objectives to training 




man~gement syst~m and management information system will not 
achieve training efficiency if the training courses are not de-
signed to produce an output that meets the needs of the operating 
forces. The Polar•is Training Program has over compensated in its 
initial training courses because of the lack of specific training 
objectives. This has allowed Polaris training to remain highly 
effective but relatively inefficient. A systematic evaluation 
and determination of training requirements is needed and can be 
obtained through such prodecures as Job Task Analysis. The formu-
lation of valid Terminal Performance Objectives can then supply 
the feedback data necessary to evaluate both the adequacy of the 
Job Task Analysis and the effectiveness of the training provided. 
The feasibility and desirability of using the Polaris "re-
fresher training" periods as part of the total training program 
is another avenue which could be used to improve efficiency with-
out decreasing effectiveness . This luxury is not available in 
non-Polar:!.s programs . This does not mean that a similiar type of 
"refresher training" period could not be achieved Navy-wide. The 
Canadian Navy's Cyclic System is, probably, the most promising 
. 
system which could serve to make "refresher tralning" periods 
available to every Navy technical manpower training program. 
Another potential problem area vJhich Polaris has not had to 
surmount, but which other training programs have faced and are 
still facing, is the division of responsibility between BuPers and 
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the Developing Agency in formulating and conducting training for 
new weapons system. The shift of responsibility for the planning 
and conduct of training after the BUFers training activity becomes 
" functional is somewhat akin to ; 1 changir~ horses in midstream. 
In my opinion 3 this change of organizational respon-
sibility during the initial stages of a training program is in-
efficient and decreases the effectiveness of the training. 
The recommended solution to this problem is to follow the Polaris 
example. In this case, the Developing Agency, the Special Pro-
jects Office, has a training section (SP15) charged with the 
responsibility of providing BuPers with the information required 
to develop a training plan. SP15 coordinates its activities with 
BuPers and assists BuPers throughout the life of a training pro-
gram. BuPers, however, is the Training Authority with the final 
responsibility for the development, implementation, control and 
evaluation of all phases and aspects of the training plan. This 
organizational arrangement and responsibility for training has 
been effective for Polaris and could be implemented in other train-
ing programs thereby improving both training effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
Briefly, the tools for Integrated Technical Manpower Training 
Programs are available. These are the Program Manager-type 
organization, the CAPRI manpower information system and a "Tech-
nology of Training!' for the conduct of training . Additional work 
.. 
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is required in the scheduling area to permit the distribution of 
personnel to provide stabl e crews rather than filling vacancies 
in ships . The Canadian Cyclic System is a possible solution to 
this problem and certainly merits further consideration . 
In closing, it must be mentioned that although training 
efficiency may have been stressed in this paper, training effec-
tiveness is paramount . Once effectiveness is achieved and can be 
maintained, the achievement of efficiency is the next goal. 
Although both aspects of a program can be achieved concurrently, 
operational readiness of the fleet, the true measure of effective-
ness, must remain as the primary objective of any training pro-
gram . 
Polaris has demonstrated that this high l evel of readiness 
can be achieved . Now, we must try to achieve and maintain a 
similiar readiness level throughout the Navy . The effective use 
of proper management techniques , information systems , organiza-
tional structures, training technologies and scheduling practices 




EXPLANATION OF TEID~S 
BuPers: Bureau of Naval Personnel. 
BuPers Operating Divisions (Pers A, Band C): Pers A is primarily 
concer:.1ed with the planning functivns associated vJith the 
establishment of personnel requirements, Pers B 1Hith the 
distribution and assignment of personnel to fill these re-
quireMents and Pers C with the training of personnel in order 
that they may effectively fill these requirements. 
Class 11 f.. 11 Schools/Courses: These school/courses are, in general, 
designed to provide the basic technical knowledge and skills. 
required to prepare personnel for more advanced schooling or 
to perform limited tasks under supervision. 
Class "Bn Schools/Courses: These school/courses are designed to 
provide the advanced technical knowledge and skills required 
to prepare personnel for higher petty officer rates . 
Class 11 C" School::::/Courses: These schools/courses are designed to 
provide training in a particular skill or technique required 
to operate and maintain a specific equipment or system . 
Developing Agency: The Bureau or Office within the Department of 
the Navy with 'Vvhom the Chief of Naval Operations has arranged 
for the development of a system or project and which has 
over-all technical control and budgeting responsibility for 
the development, test and evaluation of the system or desig-
nated project . 
General Operational Requirement (GOR): A GOR stat es, in relative-
ly broad but significant terms, the capabilities needed by 
the Navy within each functional 'V'larfare and support area. 
Navy Training Plan: This is an official plan which provides 
planning information and assigns responsibilj_ties to a 
specific training program and fleet introduction of new 
equipment or systems in order to provide trained personnel 
in time to man this equipment or system. 
Polaris Refresher Training Schools/Courses: These schools/ 
courses are designed to provide facilities and instruction 
in operational and refresher maintenance training for FBM 
crews while in overhaul or in an "off-crew 11 status which 
could not be profitably and adequately accomplished on board 




RDT&E: 'I'he abbreviation applied to the process associated with 
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation of new equip-
ments and systems . 
3pecific Operational Requirement (SOR): SOR's state the need for 
a particular capability and outlines the system characteris-
tics which describe what capability is to be achievea. It 
defines the performance throughout the system's operational 
environment and establishes the reliab~lity, maintainability 
and personnel requirements. 
Tech...'1ical Development Plan: A comprehensive plan for the develop-
ment and evaluation of a weapons or support. system . This is 
designed to fulfill a Specific Operational Requirement and. 
has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations . 
Training Media: Any item prepared or procured with the primary 
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